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ARTICLES
STANDARDS OF CARE AND STANDARD FORM
CONTRACTS: DISTINGUISHING PATIENT RIGHTS
AND 'CONSUMER RIGHTS IN MANAGED CARE
Wendy K Mariner*
INTRODUCTION
There is hardly a legislature in the country that is not currently de-
bating the issue of patient rights in managed care. Not surprisingly, leg-
islators, as well as reporters covering the debate, have called upon
George J. Annas, Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law and Chair of
the Health Law Department at Boston University, for information and
advice. Professor Annas has earned the title of "father of patient rights"
for his decades of research, writing, and advocacy on behalf of individu-
als who need health care and deserve justice.'
Today, however, one might ask whether patient rights are compatible
with managed care.2 After all, much of the impetus for managed care
* Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Public Health and
School of Medicine. J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1971; LL.M., New
York University School of Law, 1976, M.P.H., Harvard School of Public Health,
1979.
1. Professor Annas literally.wrote the book on patient rights: GEORGE J.
ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF
PATIENTS]. Other books by George Annas dealing with patient rights issues in-
clude SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE MARKET (1998) [hereinafter SOME
CHOICE]; SITANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS (1993) [herein-
after STANDARD OF CARE]; and JUDGING MEDICINE (1988) [hereinafter JUDGING
MEDICINE]. Professor Annas has also written extensively on the rights of research
subjects, who may or may not also be patients. See, e.g., THE NAZI DOCTORS AND
THE NUREM3ERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (George J.
Annas & Michael A. Grodon eds., 1992); GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE SUBJECT'S
DILEMMA (1977).
2. The term "managed care" is used in its broadest sense to mean any
health insunuce plan that, in exchange for a fixed premium, finances and arranges
for medical ,zare for a group of individuals, with varying degrees of management of
the medical care provided to those individuals or the mechanisms for delivering
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was to counter the rising demand for, and cost of, medical care. Much of
the managed care industry's success in lowering health insurance pre-
mium costs may be attributed to limiting patient choices and treatments,
especially. in regard to the length of hospital stays.3 Indeed, the managed
care industry does not speak of the rights of "patients." Instead, it de-
scribes the rights and responsibilities of members or consumers.
4
such care. The National Conference of State Legislatures has defined managed
care as:
a term that describes health care systems that integrate the financ-
ing and delivery of appropriate health services to covered indi-
viduals by arrangements with selected providers to furnish a com-
prehensive set of health services, explicit standards for selection of
health care providers, formal programs for ongoing quality assur-
ance and utilization review, and significant financial incentives for
members to use providers and procedures associated with the plan.
KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW AND AMERIcAN HEALTH CARE 83 (1998)
(quoting The National Conference of State Legislatures). Insurance companies,
hospital and medical service companies, and employers offer managed care plans
in a wide variety of structures, from closed panel health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), to preferred provider organizations (PPOs), to networks of insurers and
groups of physicians and hospitals. For a reasonably comprehensive description of
the types of managed care organizations, see HEALTH LAW CENTER, ASPEN
PUBLICATIONS, MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS, AFFILIATED ENTITIES, AND
INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS, MANAGED CARE LAW MANUAL 1-9 (1997). For
descriptions of the recent growth and variety of managed care organizations, see
generally Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, 16
HEALTH AFF. 134 (1997); Alice G. Gosfield, The New Playing Field, 41 ST. Louis
L.J. 869 (1997).
3. See Wendy K. Mariner, Business v. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Stan-
dards for Managed Care, 23 AM. J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 236 (1995). Managed care
organizations have recently begun to raise premiums, prompting renewed fears that
the cost reductions achieved to date were one time only savings, and that, given a
growing elderly population and more advances in medical technology, higher pre-
miums are necessary to cover new costs. See Ian Fisher, H.MO. Premiums Rising
Sharply, Stoking Debate on Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998, at A23. A
Health Care Financing Administration report predicts that national health expendi-
tures will double to $2.1 trillion in 2007. See Robert Pear, Sharp Rise Predicted in
Health-Care Spending in the Next Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, at A21.
For seminal accounts of the inevitability of such increases, see Henry Aaron &
William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us, 247 SCIENCE
418 (1990); William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-
Containment Strategies: Why They Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA
220 (1987).
4. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, STANDARDS
FOR ACCREDITATION OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS, 49-53 (1996);
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Professor Annas critiqued "managed care's attempt to transform the
patient into a consumer" because it portends the potential loss of im-
portant rights for everyone. 5 The change in language both reflects and
encourage; conceptualizing health care as a market commodity.6 While
doctors and hospitals have patients, markets have consumers. Annas
argues thai: if patients metamorphose into consumers, the law must con-
tinue to protect individuals as patients. Just as he developed a model bill
of patient rights in 1975,7 Annas now proposes a national bill of patient
rights for tlie new era in which managed care plays a prominent role.8
Annas has been the trailblazer in patient rights, mapping new ground
in law with succinct and pungent writing that captures the essence of a
PRESIDENT's ADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY IN THE
HEALTH CAIRE INDUS., CONSUMER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (Nov. 1997) [hereinafter, PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N];
PRINCIPLES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION (1997) (a joint statement of Kaiser Per-
manente, Group Health of Puget Sound, Health Insurance Plan (HIP), and Families
USA). Health plan contracts typically refer to individual members as members or
enrollees.
5. See George J. Annas, A National Bill of Patient Rights, 338 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 695, 696 (1998) [hereinafter A National Bill.
6. This follows a general shift from medical terminology to market termi-
nology, in which physicians, nurses, dentists, hospitals, home health agencies, other
professionals and facilities are all called "providers" or, sometimes "vendors," and
the proportion of premium revenues spent on patient care is the "medical loss ra-
tio." Insurers have also called their insureds "covered lives," which does not in-
clude people without insurance. See SOME CHOICE, supra note 1, at 44-51 (arguing
that the market metaphors used in health care have transformed not only the way
people think about medicine, but also misrepresent reality); see also generally Ed-
mund D. Pellegrino, Words Can Hurt You: Some Reflections on the Metaphors of
Managed Care, 7 J. AM. BD. OF FAM. PRAC. 505 (1994) (noting how the use of
certain terms changes the general perception of health care).
7. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS (1975).
8. See A National Bill, supra note 5, at 697-99. Annas proposes that the
following categories of patient rights be protected by national legislation applicable
to all Americans, whether or not they are covered by health insurance or managed
care: The right to treatment information; the right to privacy and dignity; the right
to refuse treatment; the right to emergency care; and the right to an advocate. In
addition, he proposes that consumers with health insurance should be entitled to
information about the health plan and financial incentives for physicians to limit
care, payment for emergency care, a reasonable choice of primary care physicians,
reasonable access to specialists, timely access to an independent appeals mecha-
nism for denial of benefits, and free communication with one's physician without
health plan interference. See id
1998]
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patient's place in medicine. He has left little for the rest of us to do but
fill in the details. This article follows in that tradition by developing the
distinction between patient rights and consumer rights and examining
what the contours of law that protects both might look like. The first
section of this article describes the difference between rights ascribed to
patients and consumers respectively, and the general nature of laws that
have traditionally protected each. Patient rights focus on the relationship
between patients, physicians or other "providers" regarding the type and
qualityof care provided. Consumer rights focus on purchasing decisions
before forming a provider relationship or agreeing to a contract. The
second section differentiates the health care delivery and insurance
functions of managed care that affect patient rights and consumer rights,
respectively, noting that some elements have mixed effects. These dif-
ferences are developed in the third section, which argues that current
efforts to regulate managed care conflate patients with consumers, and
that the resulting reliance on consumer choice to protect patient rights is
misplaced. Section four outlines the problems with conceptualizing
managed care issues solely within the consumer model. The choice of a
health plan is but one of many rights today's patients deem important.
However, an increasing number of Americans retain little, if any,
meaningful choice of health plans. Consumer rights are necessary to
help people choose a health plan, but they are not sufficient to protect
patients when they need medical care. Moreover, consumer choice en-
courages a perception that managed care plans can be understood as
simple contracts between willing buyers and sellers, with the contract
defining all the parties' rights and duties. This raises the question
whether contracts should supersede tort obligations in providing patient
care. Section five argues that managed care issues cannot always be re-
solved satisfactorily by applying traditional contract principles exclusive
of tort principles. Finally, section six suggests viewing managed care
plans as a hybrid incorporating elements of standard form insurance
contracts, far removed from the idealized contract model, as well as
elements of professional service agreements for personal medical care
traditionally governed by tort standards. While some contract doctrines
may serve to protect consumers in their financial dealings, the law
should protect patients as well as consumers in the complex reality of
managed care relationships. Thus, there is a need for extra-contractual
tort standards to protect the rights of patients, whether or not they are
members of a managed care plan.
(V/ol. 15:1
Patient and Consumer Rights in Managed Care
I. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONSUMERS AND PATIENTS
A. Consumers
Consumers are buyers of goods and services. In the ideal competitive
marketplac:e, buyers and sellers have equal bargaining power, so that
their decisions to buy and sell are made freely, without coercion or un-
due advantage.9 Of course, the perfectly competitive market of economic
theory has yet to exist. There are multiple imbalances between buyers
and seller;, in both information and ability to make choices and pur-
chases. In some circumstances, the law has intervened to help make the
buyer's bargaining position more equal to that of the seller.'
0
Buyers may be disadvantaged in two ways. They may be unable, wit-
tingly or unwittingly, to make a voluntary choice, or they may be unable
to make a desired purchase. Constraints on choice include lack of in-
formation or incorrect information about products. Buyers may not be
aware of material facts about a product that might dissuade them from
buying it. Also, advertising influences some buyers' judgments in ways
they may not recognize or desire. These informational constraints make
it difficult for consumers to make informed choices about whether to
buy a certain product. As to the second point, some consumers cannot
buy what they would choose because they cannot afford it or it is not
available where they are located. Others may have such an immediate
need for a product that they must buy whatever is immediately at hand.
Consumer protection laws are intended to protect consumers' freedom
to make voluntary choices, not purchases. The law does not concern
itself with consumers' inability to pay for a desired product or service.
The notion of consumer as buyer implies the ability to pay, but not the
capacity to afford whatever one might choose given unlimited financial
resources. One does not assume consumers as a class are equal in re-
sources or ability to pay. Nevertheless, the law justified intervention to
redress other imbalances in bargaining power.
The major tool of consumer protection laws is information disclosure.
9. See generally MARK A. HALL, MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE
LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997).
10. S e generally Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed
Care: Issuey, Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 HOUS. L. REv. 1319 (1996)
(providing a comprehensive analysis of consumer protection issues in managed
care).
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Where consumers are likely to lack information that is relevant to de-
ciding whether to buy something, legislation requires sellers (or manu-
facturers) to disclose that information. For example, banks are required
to inform borrowers of the effective annual percentage rate (APR) of
interest charged on a loan." Product liability law requires manufacturers
and sellers to disclose product risks that would not be expected by the
average prudent consumer.12 The goal is to redress the imbalance in in-
formation between buyer and seller, thus moving toward the market
ideal that consumers should have perfect information to make reasona-
bly informed choices. 3 Consumer protection laws also prohibit decep-
tive marketing and advertising practices.1
4
A second, less often used tool of consumer protection is product stan-
dards. 15 The law rarely requires sellers to offer any particular product.
11. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1694
(1997 & Supp.); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617
(1994).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. j, k (1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i, § 10 (1998).
13. Disclosure of product information is not a panacea, however. Even
assuming, contrary to much evidence, that relevant information can be collected
and distributed in a useful form, consumers are often unable to understand it or act
on it. See Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians Conflicts of Interest: The Limitations of
Disclosure, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1406 (1989); see also MARC A. RODWIN,
MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 216-17
(1993) (noting that laypeople are significantly less familiar with medical matters
than with market and financial matters, so that obtaining and understanding medi-
cal information is especially difficult for patients); Susan Edgman-Levitan & Paul
D. Cleary, What Information Do Consumers Want and Need?, HEALTH AFF., Win-
ter, 1996, at 42, 44; John E. Ware, What Information Do Consumers Want and How
Do They Use I?, 33 MED. CARE JS25 (J. Supp. 1995).
14. See Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. 1981)
("Recognizing the disparity in the bargaining positions of the companies which
write insurance and the consumers who buy the policies, both the statutory law and
judicial decisions have aimed at making certain that the interests of every insured
are protected.").
15. If managed care organizations considered their insurance policies or
health plans to be "products," then arguably such products could carry an implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness for use, which includes at least minimum
standards of quality in the care actually provided. For an argument that managed
care plans should be subject to an implied warranty of quality, see generally Wil-
liam S. Brewbaker III, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations:
The Implied Warranty of Quality, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1997).
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However, both state and federal consumer protection legislation occa-
sionally require that products meet certain safety standards. Both state
and federal law prohibit provisions in banking, securities, residential
lease, and consumer product sales contracts that are unfair or in viola-
tion of public policy. For example, banks are often prohibited from fore-
closing on delinquent loans without giving the debtor an opportunity to
pay the amount owed. Such statutory limitations typically apply to con-
tracts of adhesion where individual consumers are seldom in positions of
bargaining equality with sellers like banks and large corporations.
16
Finally, consumer protection laws also serve the larger goal of pro-
moting market efficiency. In this, they resemble antitrust laws, whose
purpose is to foster free and competitive markets, where no seller is able
to obtain monopoly power, to achieve the most desirable array of goods
and services of the quality and at the lowest prices valued by the popu-
lation. 7
B. Patients
Everyone is, or will be, a patient, whether or not one has health insur-
ance. The rights of patients developed outside the context of commercial
markets, independently of health insurance, and without regard to the
existence or source of payment for health care.18 Although patients his-
torically purchased their health care, patients were not considered con-
sumers until very recently. This is because the concept of "patient" de-
notes a recipient of health care services. Whether, or how, health care
16. For the seminal exposition of contracts of adhesion, see generally
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
17. The U.S. Supreme Court's often cited statement on the purpose of anti-
trust laws appeared in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 3
(1958). There, the Court stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competi-
tion. as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allo-
cation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
qualit and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
ro'idin& an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions. But even if that
reinise were open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down
y he Act is competition.
Id.
18. See A National Bill, supra note 5, at 697.
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might be paid for is irrelevant to the status of patient. One becomes a
patient when one is ill, injured or in need of medical care. Ordinarily, a
patient is in a relationship with a physician, nurse or other health care
professional. The law governing patient rights developed hand-in-hand
with the medical profession's increasing capacity to cure disease.
Historically, patients never were in an "equal bargaining relationship"
with their physicians. It was assumed that physicians have special
knowledge and skills that patients do not possess.19 This is why patients
seek the advice and care of physicians. This inherent imbalance in
knowledge and skill is a defining characteristic of the physician-patient
relationship. Moreover, patients are usually sick and not able to function
at their own normal capacity. Thus, while consumers are in a position of
equal bargaining power with sellers, patients are in a position of ine-
quality with physicians and other health professionals.
Unlike consumer protection law, the law of patient rights does not
seek to give patients and physicians equal medical knowledge. Instead,
the law accepts the inequality in knowledge and skill and protects pa-
tients by imposing on physicians a fiduciary duty to use their skills .only
in the patient's best interest and to provide medical services that meet
professionally accepted standards. 20 In contrast businesses do not have
fiduciary obligations to their customers.2 1 They are in an arm's length
relationship. 22 In general, businesses are not legally bound to meet pro-
fessional standards of care in their relationships with customers. Busi-
nesses may be liable for negligence, strict liability in the manufacture of
their products, or misrepresentation. However, customer service does
not include a legal duty to protect the customer's best interest or well
being. 3
19. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1-29
(1984).
20. See generally ROBERT BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE
OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS (1979). Physicians and many other
health professionals such as nurses, dentists or optometrists must be licensed under
state law intended to set minimum (some would say minimal) requirements for
specialized knowledge and skill. See GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN
HEALTH LAW 668-74 (1990).
21. For-profit corporations have a (financial) fiduciary obligation.to their
investors. See Mariner, supra note 3, at 238.
22. See A National Bill, supra note 5, at 695.
23. For a thoughtful discussion of the nature of the.fiduciary status of physi-
cians, see generally Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided
(Vol. 15:1
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This is not to suggest that patients lack equal respect as persons under
law. On the contrary, the doctrine of informed consent grants explicit
recognition to patient autonomy and self-determination.24 It is precisely
because the patient is more knowledgeable than the physician about the
patient's life and wishes, that courts have recognized the patient's com-
mon law right to decide what, if any, medical care he or she will
receive.25 The patient's-right to decide what medical care to accept is
somewhat analogous to a consumer's choice of what to buy. However,
because riedical care requires specialized knowledge that patients lack,
courts have imposed on physicians the common law duty to provide pa-
tients with sufficient information to enable them to make decisions
about what care to accept.26 Thus, patient rights to make medical deci-
sions require the correlative duty of physicians to provide information.
27
This contrasts with the consumer-seller relationship, in which there is
no presum~ption of specialized knowledge and no general obligation to
provide consumers with the information that consumers deem material
to deciding to buy a product. Common law principles governing product
liability require manufacturers and sellers to offer consumers warnings
of risks that would not be expected by the ordinary consumer.28 How-
ever, warnings about medical devices and drugs that are available to
patients only through physicians by prescription need only be given to
Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 241 (1995).
24. See generally THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS, supra note 1; JUDGING
MEDICNE, .upra note 1, at 27-35; RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER
RELATIONSI-HP (1982).
25. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. App. 1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (1972).
26. ,ee cases cited supra note 25.
27. See generally Drummond Rennie, Informed Consent by "Well-Nigh
Abject" Addts, 32 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 971 (1980). To date, courts have recog-
nized the duty to provide information only for physicians. If other health profes-
sionals are responsible for making medical recommendations to patients, then they
may also be become bound by a similar duty.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388-389; RESTATEMENT
(THRD) OF TORTS § 2 (1998).
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physicians.29 This is because their use requires specialized medical
knowledge. The physician should act as a "learned intermediary" be-
tween the manufacturer and the patient by weighing the risks and bene-
fits of a particular product and by determining whether to recommend it
to a patient. Of course, the patient still has the right to reject the recom-
mendation. But it is the physician, not the manufacturer or seller, that
has the obligation to provide information to the patient.
Since the patient rights movement of the 1970s, patients have consis-
tently received more protection than consumers. While consumers may
have access to some of their credit information, patients are entitled to
all the information in their medical records because the information be-
longs to them. Some patients' rights have no analogy in the marketplace.
For example, the right to privacy during the course of medical treatment
is based on the need for openness and trust in the physician patient rela-
tionship, and the fact that the patient often must expose his body to the
physician.
30
Of special importance is the recognition of patients' rights to emer-
gency care, beginning with court decisions in the 1960s 31 and culminat-
ing in state and federal legislation requiring hospitals with emergency
departments to provide care to patients with emergency medical condi-
tions regardless of insurance coverage or the ability to pay.32 This is the
29. See Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs,
and Patient Information, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 633, 699 (1986); Nancy K. Plant,
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine for an Old Ailment, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1996).
30. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing a different
constitutional right to privacy, encompassing a woman's right to decide to termi-
nate her pregnancy, but emphasizing that the decision was a medical decision to be
made in the privacy of the physician-patient relationship). See generally PRIVACY
PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1977); George J. Annas, et al. The Right of Privacy Protects the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 263 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 858 (1991). See, e.g., Estate of Berthiaume
v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 797 (Me. 1976) (discussing privacy during treatment);
Home v. Patton, 287 So.2d 824 (Ala. 1974) (discussing confidentiality); Hague v.
Williams, 181 A.2d 345,349 (N.J. 1962) (discussing confidentiality).
31. See Manlove v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 174 A.2d 135 (1961) (recog-
nizing a state common law obligation for private hospitals offering emergency
services to provide care in an emergency); Karen Rothenberg, Who Cares? The
Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 21, 33-
50 (1989).
32. Texas was the first state to adopt such legislation. See TEx. HEALTH &
[Vol. 15:1
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only right to medical care enjoyed by all Americans.33 The right to
emergency care is an entitlement unique in the common law and it is
justified entirely by patient need. Not even housing or education as-
sumes equal importance in the law.
34
Courts have recognized patient rights primarily to protect patients
against the possibility of physicians' misuse of expertise. It is little
wonder why courts are willing to protect patients where they would not
protect consumers. In addition to the difference in circumstances, lack
of protection in matters of health care can result in serious disability or
death. Moreover, patients do not choose their own medical treatment in
the same way that consumers choose to buy services. For the most part,
providers, must first determine what is appropriate for the patient, and
the patient may only accept or refuse what is offered by providers.
35
Courts have consistently viewed physician responsibilities to patients
as a matter of tort law governing standards of conduct to prevent per-
sonal harm.36 The law imposes legal duties on physicians regardless of
their consent.37 In contrast, consumer rights are based primarily in con-
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4438(a) (superceded by TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
311.021-311.022 (West 1992)). The federal law applies to all hospitals with emer-
gency departments that participate in Medicare or Medicaid, although the obliga-
tion to provide emergency care applies to all patients with an emergency medical
condition or women in active labor. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
33. States have an obligation to attend to the serious medical needs of pris-
oners and pretrial detainees incarcerated in correctional institutions under the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment because they are unable
to obtain medical care without the state's permission and assistance. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (finding that the state's "deliberate indifference" to the
serious medical needs of prisoners can violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cniel and unusual treatment).
.34. See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
35. See Adam Yarmolinsky, Supporting the Patient, 332 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
602, 602 (1995) ("Patients may be the only consumers who have to seek permis-
sion from someone else in order to obtain services.").
36. Legislation has supplemented or modified some common law principles
with respect to the confidentiality of medical records and the patient's right to gain
access to, and copies of, such records. See THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS, supra note 1,
at 160-74.
37. Indeed, the obligation to provide information as required by the doctrine
of informe:d consent was strenuously resisted by many in the medical profession for
many years. See generally KATZ, supra note 19.
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tract law, where the defining characteristic is the voluntary consent of
both parties to the contract terms. Courts have not permitted physicians
to contractually alter their fiduciary duties.
38
II. PATIENT RIGHTS AND CONSUMER RIGHTS IN
MANAGED CARE
Table I of this paper offers a possible classification separating man-
aged care issues into predominantly consumer concerns and predomi-
nantly patient concerns. For the purposes of this classification, consumer
concerns are defined as issues that are relevant to decisions to purchase
and/or join a managed care plan. Patient concerns are defined as issues
that are primarily relevant to personal health care, independent of pay-
ment. There are, of course, issues that concern both consumers and pa-
tients. Included in a third category of mixed issues, shown in Table II,
are those issues with the strongest claim to both concerns. This classifi-
cation does not purport to be either exhaustive or immutable. It is in-
tended primarily to demonstrate that there are important differences
between protecting consumers and protecting patients.
A. Consumer Concerns
Consumer protection laws do not attempt to ensure that a manufac-
turer of consumer goods remains financially capable of staying in busi-
ness. However, the states seek to ensure the fiscal solvency of insurance
companies so that companies will be able to make promised payments to
38. There have been several proposals to allow providers and patients to
contractually alter the standard of care in return for lower charges, either to reduce
health care costs in general or to reduce the frequency or cost of malpractice
claims. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for
Contract, 1976 AM. BAR FOUND. REs. J. 87 (1976); see also Clark C. Havighurst,
Private Reform of Tort Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles,
49 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS. 143 (1986). See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Making
Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587, 589 (1997)
(proposing enterprise liability as an exclusive remedy for patients, with opportuni-
ties to reduce liability by voluntary contractual waivers). For arguments against
contractual limitations on the standard of care, see generally P. S. Atiyah, Medical
Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287
(1986); Sylvia A. Law, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Re-
liefi-Perspectives on the Reform Agenda, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305-20
(1986); RANDALL BJOVBERG, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: PROBLEMS & REFORMS
(1995).
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claimants. 39 A managed care plan is, in part, an insurance policy. Thus,
consumer issues in managed care include a managed care organization's
financial solvency and investments. Furthermore, management capaci-
ties are relevant because managed care organizations promise to deliver
not money payments but health care services to those insured. This re-
quires sufficient expertise and organization to maintain relationships
with and pay providers for the duration of the service period. In addi-
tion, the providers must be sufficient in number to provide the services
promised to the consumer in the future. Indeed, this assurance is the
basic product the consumer seeks. Because medical services are to be
provided in the future, and not at the time of the signing of the contract,
consumers are justifiably concerned with a managed care organization's
ability to provide care at a later date. A reasonable consumer would not
be likely to enter into a contract with an organization that offered no
assurance of being able to fulfill its promises.
Many consumer concerns are information-related because consumers
are presumed to base purchasing decisions on information about the
products. As noted earlier, the law rarely concerns itself with the nature
of products on the market. The managed care industry argues that gov-
ernment should not impose content requirements for managed care plans
because organizations should be free to offer a variety of insurance
products, and regulation would stifle innovation. 0 Instead, the emphasis
is on facilitating consumer choice by offering information that describes
various plan "products." 41 Thus, consumer concerns include disclosure
39. See Henry T. Greely, The Regulation of Private Insurance, in HEALTH
CARE CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND REGULATION § 8.13.1 (Mark Hall ed.,
1997).
40. 'Examples of testimony before legislative committees and white papers
can be found at the web sites of trade associations, such as the American Associa-
tion of Health Plans (AAHP) and the Health Insurance Association of America.
Some non-profit health plans favor some types of government regulation. See gen-
erally Steve Zatkin, A Health Plan's View of Government Regulation, HEALTH
AFF., Nov.,Dec., 1997, at 33.
41. Alain C. Enthoven's early advocacy of prepaid group health plans ar-
gued that consumers would force plans to improve quality and reduce premiums
prices by choosing and joining only the best plans. See generally ALAIN C.
ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING
COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980). Current proponents of leaving health insurance,
including managed care, to a more or less unregulated market use the same or
similar arguments. See, e.g., REGINA HERZLINGER, MARKET DRIVEN HEALTH CARE
(1997); EP!;TEIN, supra note 9; Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and
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of information about the benefits covered and excluded by a managed
care plan, limitations on benefits, and procedures that must be followed
to obtain care or coverage. Their concerns also include disclosure of
information about physicians and other health professionals, such as
licensure, specialty certification, years of experience, malpractice
claims, location, and whether they are accepting patients. Consumers are
also concerned with obtaining similar information about health care fa-
cilities. Disclosure requirements do not impose any specific substantive
requirements on the care provided. However, they help consumers learn
what kinds of care may be expected, where, from whom, and under what
conditions.
B. Patient Concerns
The quality of care is a uniquely patient-oriented concern, independ-
ent of payment. 42 Quality includes the competence of providers in diag-
nosing, preventing, and treating illness and injury. Concerns about the
quality of care arise primarily when one becomes a patient and seeks
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment. The law of professional negligence,
of course, imposes on physicians and other providers a duty of care to
patients, without regard to payment.43 The duty arises out of the pro-
vider's special knowledge and skill in the treatment of human beings,
and the exclusive authority to use that knowledge as conferred by state
Collective Action in Regulating Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at
26.
42. This is not to suggest that measuring quality is a simple matter. See
generally Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better
or Worse Quality of Care?, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 7 (1997); REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, HEALTH CARE
REFORM: "REPORT CARDS" ARE USEFUL BUT SIGNIFICANT ISSUES NEED TO BE
ADDRESSED (1994); Symposium, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical
Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525 (1996); Arnold Epstein, Perform-
ance Reports on Quality-Prototypes, Problems and Prospects, 333 NEW ENO. J.
MED. 57 (1995); Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Re-
form: Promise and Limitations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37 (1994); Jerome P. Kassirer,
The Quality of Care and the Quality of Measuring It, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1293
(1993).
43. Payment may serve as evidence that a physician-patient relationship
exists in order to determine whether a physician owes a duty of care to the patient.
Nonetheless, the law applies to the relationship, however created, not because of
any payment made. See generally WING ET AL., supra note 2, at 606-12.
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licensure. Physicians are directly and personally accountable to patients
for injuries caused by their failure to conform to the professional stan-
dard of ce-re.44 Physicians cannot require patients to accept a lower stan-
dard of care or waive the right to sue for malpractice.
45
Other concerns traditionally associated with receiving medical care
include privacy and confidentiality of personal medical information.
Patients have come to expect their physicians to keep their personal in-
formation confidential and not to disclose it without the patient's ap-
proval. Courts justify a physician's obligations to keep patient confi-
dences in order to encourage patients to tell their physicians anything
that might facilitate diagnosing and treating medical conditions.
46
Arguably, a person ceases being a consumer and becomes a patient
upon enrollment in a managed care plan. This is because the individual's
relationship with the organization and its health care professionals is no
longer that of buyer to seller. When the person begins to use the plan's
services, he or she is a patient. Moreover, as a practical matter, since
almost all managed care plans are in effect for a fixed term, typically
one year, the consumer is not able to leave the plan, rescind the contract,
or return the product until the end of the term. Thus, the person cannot
act like a consumer again until the term expires and he or she can choose
to remain in the plan or buy a different product.
C. Mixed Concerns
Several components of managed care are relevant to individuals both
as consumers and as patients. Although the package of benefits covered
by an insurance policy traditionally was considered part of the consumer
contract, individuals are also concerned about the type of treatment they
will receive as patients in the event of illness or injury. This is why the
so-called bills of patient rights before many legislatures typically in-
clude a few specific benefits. The most widely accepted mandated bene-
fit is coverage of emergency care when an individual reasonably be-
44. Even state laws governing incorporation generally prohibit physicians
(and other professionals) from insulating themselves against personal liability for
negligencc in the performance of their professional services. See generally, THE
RIGHTS OF PATIENTS, supra note 1.
45. See Emory Univ. v. Proubianski, 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981); Tunkl v.
Regents of.Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (holding that release of liability
for free medical care generally unenforceable as against public policy).
46. See cases cited supra note 30.
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lieves that serious illness or death could result from an injury or acute
medical condition.47
Both patients and consumers also have interests in the providers who
will take care of them in a managed care plan. Patients and consumers
have concerns about access to qualified physicians and other health pro-
fessionals who are capable of properly diagnosing and treating their
medical conditions. Managed care plans that have a closed panel of phy-
sicians place contractual restraints on the patient's freedom to consult
any licensed physician. The managed care industry often considers the
number and specialty of physicians and hospitals in a plan's network as
one component of the benefit package specified by the insurance con-
tract.48 The available pool of providers is also a critical element of the
quality of care for patients. Thus, basic requirements such as profes-
sional or facility licensure, certification, and accreditation are relevant to
both patient concerns about the quality of care they receive, and con-
sumer concerns about the qualifications of the providers to whom they
have access through a health plan.
Other factors influencing provider competence and the quality of care
can be relevant to both patients and consumers. For example, consumers
as well as patients have an interest in ensuring that decisions about their
care will not be influenced by conflicts of interest. Thus, statutory pro-
hibitions against referral arrangements, such as those barred by the
Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute49 and Stark Amendments,50 serve both
consumers and patients. The same is true of statutory prohibitions
against gag clauses that bar physicians from telling their patients about
how they are financially compensated by a managed care plan.
5
1
47. See, e.g., discussion supra note 32.
48. It is undoubtedly for this reason that the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners' Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model Act contains
provisions on network adequacy which require that a health plan have arrange-
ments with a sufficient number and types of providers to meet the anticipated
medical needs of its entire membership. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF INSUR.
COMM'RS, MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT, NAID
MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 74-1 - 74-13 (1996). The Presi-
dent's Advisory Commission recommended a similar requirement based on the
NAIC language.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994).
51. Most statutory prohibitions against gag clauses ensure that physicians
are free to tell patients about treatment options, including those not covered by the
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Both patients and consumers also have legitimate interests in holding
a managed care plan accountable for intentional or negligent errors. Or-
dinarily, consumer interests lie in enforcing fair contract provisions,
including promised benefits, while patients are concerned about the
quality of care they receive.52 In addition, both consumers and patients
have an interest in non-discriminatory treatment and access to plan
services. In all instances, consumers and patients expect the plan to be
accountable for its promises and obligations. Thus, the plan's legal re-
sponsibility for its acts and omissions is of critical concern, as are the
means to enforce that responsibility, the remedies, and the damages
available. Although the substance of particular disputes may vary be-
tween consumers and patients, managed care plans often provide the
same internal remedy, grievance or appeal procedures, for both groups.
Thus, one must address the fairness of mechanisms to hold managed
care plans accountable simultaneously for both patient and consumer
concerns.
1II. CONFLATING CONSUMERS WITH PATIENTS
The call for regulation of managed care stems from recognition that
patients reed protection against managed care abuses.5 3 However, most
patient's health plan. They do not typically require disclosure of other types of
information, such as physician compensation. The Massachusetts' statute does not
require any disclosure by physicians. It merely prohibits health plans from refusing
to contract with or pay physicians who tell patients about treatment options. See
MASS. GEiq. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 108, 110 (1998). Gag clauses that restrict individual
patient care recommendations are most closely related to patient concerns. Federal
legislation prohibiting gag clauses has not yet been enacted. See, e.g., The Patient
Right to Know Act, S. 449, 105th Cong. §§ 1-4 (1997).
52. Quality concerns include not only the quality of care that is provided,
but also a failure to provide care, as in missed diagnoses, misdiagnoses, and fail-
ures to provide treatment in accordance with the appropriate standard of care.
53. The word "abuses" is used to emphasize that the practices complained of
are not idtierent in managed care. For examples of such complaints, see'generally
GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN OF
MEDICAL TRUST (1996); Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous
or Reactionary?, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1601 (1996); Jerome P. Kassirer, Man-
aging Managed Care's Tarnished Image, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 338 (1997);
David S. Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds Over Managed Care; Frustrated Consumers
Push for Tougher Laws, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al. Many media reports
about managed care emphasize problems or perceived abuses. See Paul M. Ell-
wood & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work in Progress, 276 JAMA
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proposals for patient rights recently debated in Congress and state leg-
islatures focus on protecting consumer concerns. 54 Such bills included
provisions requiring managed care organizations to give their members
information about health plan benefits and limitations, physicians in the
network, treatment preauthorization rules, and grievance procedures. 55
This is consistent with the assumption that, like consumer protection
laws, the legislation's goal is to permit consumers to make a knowl-
edgeable choice of health plans, not to prescribe what the products
should be.
Some legislation requires that health plans cover emergency care and
other mandated benefits, such as requiring health plans to pay for a
minimum post-delivery hospital stay for women and their newborns.
56
Some require health plans to permit standing referrals to specialists for
certain medical conditions, 57 while still others prohibit "gag clauses" in
1083, 1084 (1996); see generally Karen Ignagni, Covering a Breaking Revolution:
The Media and Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 26 (1998).
54. In 1998, Congress failed to pass any of the bills introduced to regulate
managed care or protect consumers. The House of Representatives passed the
Republican leadership's bill in July 1998, The Patient Protection Act of 1998, H.R.
4250, sponsored by Rep. Newt Gingrich (D-Ga.) and others, which later died in the
Senate along with the competing bills, such as The Patients' Bill of Rights Act of
1998, S. 1890, sponsored by Sen. Tom Daschle and others. See S. 1890, 105th
Cong. (1998).
55. For analyses of earlier state legislation adopted by the states, see
GERALDINE DALLEK ET AL., 1 CONSUMER PROTECTION IN STATE HMO LAWS,
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1995); PATRICIA BUTLER & K. POLZER,
PRIVATE-SECTOR HEALTH COVERAGE: VARIATIONS IN CONSUMER PROTECTIONS
UNDER ERISA AND STATE LAW (1996).
56. Maryland was the first state to adopt such a law, quickly followed by
New Jersey, Massachusetts, and other states. See George Annas, Women and Chil-
dren First, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1647, 1648 (1995). However, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), precludes enforcement of such man-
dated benefits against self-funded ERISA plans. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). For overviews of the effect of ERISA on
state legislation to regulate managed care, see Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation
of Managed Care and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 1986 (1996). Congress adopted the Mothers and Newborns Protec-
tion Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1997), which amended ERISA to imposed minimum
standards on all plans offering childbirth benefits. See id
57. See Fred J. Hellinger, The Expanding Scope of State Legislation, 276
JAMA 1065, 1066 (1996).
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contracts with physicians.58 So far, sixteen states require external review
of some cr all denials of benefits.5 9 In addition, Medicare and Medicaid
regulations limit the financial incentive arrangements that participating
managed care organizations may use to compensate their physicians.
60
These specific statutes resemble consumer protection laws that impose
individual product safety standards or bar particular practices in re-
sponse to consumer complaints about specific dangers or deceptions.
Laws requiring minimum post-delivery hospital stays, for example, were
prompted by outrage from women who felt that they were being denied
necessary medical care promised under their health plan.
There has been little pressure, however, for laws that would regulate
corporate governance, for-profit or nonprofit status, overall health plan
benefit structures, operating expenditures, "medical loss ratios," utiliza-
tion review standards, or other larger issues. The result is legislation that
tells consumers more about what health plan "products" are on the mar-
ket, but does little to make the product "safe." Moreover, many state
laws are not enforceable against managed care plans offered by employ-
ers and unions that are governed by the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).6
Federal legislation could produce a true national bill of patient rights
that Profi-ssor Annas proposes. This is because federal legislation could
apply to all patients, regardless of their insurance status.62 By and large,
however, federal efforts to regulate managed care mimic state law pro-
posals arid suffer from the same narrow focus on consumer concerns.
Therefore , federal legislation preempting state law may result in patients
having fewer rights than they have now. State managed care legislation
58. For a critical view of gag clauses, see generally Steffie Woolhandler &
David U. Rimmelstein, Extreme Risk - The New Corporate Proposition for Physi-
cians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706 (1995).
59. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HMO COMPLAINTS AND
APPEALS: MOST KEY PROCEDURES IN PLACE, BUT OTHERS VALUED BY
CONSUMERS LARGELY ABSENT, GAO/HEHS-98-119 (May 1998). See generally
George J. Annas, Patients' Rights in Managed Care-Exit, Voice and Choice, 337
NEW ENG.. J. MED. 210 (1997).
60. See Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans, 42 C.F.R. § 417A79
(1997).
61. See generally Mariner, supra note 56, at 1986; Mary Ann Chirba-Martin
& Troyen: A. Brennan, The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health Reform, 13
HEALTH AFF. 142 (1994).
62. See A National Bill, supra note 5, at 697.
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at least has the virtue of leaving patient rights under state law undis-
turbed.
The legislative emphasis on consumer, as opposed to patient, rights
can be illustrated by the recommendations of the President's Advisory
Commission.63 One would expect any bill of rights to include the right
to informed consent. The Commission's surprisingly worded recom-
mendation says that "consumers have the right and responsibility to
fully participate in all decisions related to their health care."" What
counts as participation is not clear. Although the commentary includes a
good list of information subject to disclosure, it does not indicate
whether its conception of this right includes the well-established right to
refuse treatment for any reason. 65 Similarly, the Commission's statement
of a right to confidentiality of health information is less protective than
existing law.
66
The Advisory Commission also recommended that consumers should
have "a right to a choice of health care providers sufficient to ensure
63. It is significant that the Commission did not recommend that the "rights"
be enacted into law to ensure that they would be legally enforceable.
64. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 4, at ch. 4. The Com-
mentary notes that open communication promotes positive outcomes, compliance
and consumer satisfaction. In particular, the justification of this right is the
"asymmetry of information between consumer and health care provider." Id. This
supports the physician's legal duty to provide information to patients. But that
duty is premised on the individual patient's right to autonomy and self-
determination, which the Commission fails to mention.
65. The information should include treatment options, their benefits, the
risks, and the consequences, the use of advance directives, methods of physician
compensation, and other financial interests that could influence treatment deci-
sions. See id.
66. The Commission states that "the quality of the health care system also
depends on the regular exchange of information between providers, employers,
plans, public health authorities, researchers, and other users." Id, at ch. 6. With
such a wide exchange, it is hard to imagine who does not have access to one's con-
fidential medical information. The Commission notes that individually identifiable
information should not be disclosed without written consent except "in very limited
circumstances where there is a clear legal basis for doing so." Id These reasons
include "medical or health care research for which an institutional review board has
determined anonymous records will not suffice, investigation of health care fraud,
and public health reporting." id. This evidences either poor drafting or a misun-
derstanding of the law governing federally funded research with human subjects,
which precludes the use of identifiable information for research without written
consent.
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access to appropriate high-quality health care."67 This does not mean
that consumers are entitled to choose their health plan or their physi-
cians. The Commission rejected any requirement that consumers be of-
fered any particular choices.68 As the commentary makes clear, it
amounts to a duty on the part of managed care plans to contract with a
minimum number of providers to provide covered benefits for plan
members.'s9 The Commission argued that this "right" is justified because
it benefits the marketplace to have consumers choose among competing
"products." The Commission described consumer choice as the "hall-
mark of a healthy marketplace," enhancing consumer satisfaction and
confidence in their caregivers. This may be true, but it is thin justifica-
tion for a. legal right. If, in the future, consumer choice turned out to
hinder a "'healthy marketplace," would that mean that the consumer's
right to choose should be revoked? There was no mention of the value of
having the market provide products that consumers need. In essence, it
was assumed that because the market is the best way to meet the needs
of consumners, patient rights should be limited to those things that pro-
mote the efficient functioning of a market. This turns the role of patient
rights on its head.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CONSUMER MODEL
The debate over patient rights in managed care and the proposed pro-
tective legislation are based on an idealized consumer model. Propo-
nents of a competitive health insurance market argue that consumer
67. Id. at ch. 2. The language tracks that of the National Association of
Insurance Connissioners' Model Act. This is certainly a necessary element of a
plan, since no plan should be considered competent to offer services if it does not
have the professional resources to provide care.
68. The Commission decided that it was "unacceptable" to recommend that
people be given more choice because it would cost more and employers might
reduce or drop coverage. See id However, the percentage of employees covered
by employer-provided plans steadily declined during the past decade while pre-
mium costs remained relatively stable. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
EMPLOYM3NT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE: COSTS INCREASE AND FAMILY
CovERAGv DECREASES (Feb. 1997).
69. The Commission rejected any requirement that plans contract with all
qualified providers or that plans allow members to see providers outside the plan's
network. Plans are permitted to have closed panels of providers as long as the pool
itself is adequately large. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 4, at
ch. 2.
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choice will force managed care organizations to compete by improving
quality and service, as well as lowering prices, to meet consumer de-
mand. 70 Hence, the emphasis is on improving consumers' ability to
choose among plans by providing accurate and unbiased information.
But there are both empirical and conceptual problems with this ap-
proach. As a practical matter, consumers are not free to exercise the
choices on which a competitive market depends. Furthermore, it is un-
likely that they can, or will, make choices about their medical care that
will solve the problems of quality or price. In addition, if contract law is
the dominant legal paradigm for consumer rights, contract obligations
that ignore important concerns of patient care may displace important
patient rights now governed by tort law.
Characterizing members of managed care plans as consumers is both
inaccurate and misleading. It assumes that individuals select and negoti-
ate their own individual contracts with health plans and insurance com-
panies. The emphasis is on the consumer's freedom to choose. But only
a tiny proportion of managed care members buy their membership indi-
vidually from a managed care organization. This portion includes people
who are self-employed and employees of businesses that do not offer
group health insurance.71 Most people obtain their health insurance
through their employer or union's group health plan.72 The employer's
70. See generally HALL, supra note 9; EPSTEIN, supra note 9; ENTHoVEN,
supra note 41.
71. About 150 million people are insured under group health insurance plans
offered by private employers and trade unions. About ten million people are en-
rolled in managed care plans under individual policies. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (1995).
72. Because employers outnumber unions that offer health benefits, for sim-
plicity, this article uses the term "employer" rather than employers, unions, and
multiemployer groups. See Thomas Bodenheimer & Kip Sullivan, How Large
Employers Are Shaping the Health Care Marketplace, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1084, 1086 (1998). Nor do individuals that get their benefits from government
programs like Medicare and Medicaid negotiate a health plan contract because a
federal statute defines the benefits and regulations. Theoretically, beneficiaries
could peruse the law to determine their specific entitlements, although few do and
it is unclear how many, including attorneys, understand what the law covers. Both
Medicare and Medicaid issued summaries for beneficiaries, which may or may not
be more informative than the summaries issued by private plans. At the same time,
there is no pretense that beneficiaries negotiate the terms of their coverage. Courts
consistently find such programs to be voluntarily offered by government, which
defines the benefits. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,299 (1980). Beneficiaries
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benefit manager or financial officer typically selects the health plans
that the company offers to its employees. Some employers negotiate the
terms of the insurance contract, but many simply choose among standard
plans offered by the managed care organizations and insurers. 73 Employ-
ees must choose from one or more plans in final form on a take it or
leave it basis. 74 The employee cannot renegotiate the terms of the plan.
If the employee is displeased with the plan's offer, his only option is not
to enroll. 0f course, many employees do not even have that option be-
cause their employer only offers one plan. 75 Furthermore, some plans
charge such high premiums that employees cannot afford them, so that
choice is i'llusory.
76
Critics of employer-provided group insurance argue that most em-
ployers base their choice of plans almost exclusively on price, preferring
are not denied benefits on the theory that they have agreed to limitations.
73. Havighurst argues that employees are well served by having relatively
sophisticated employers negotiate health insurance contracts on their behalf. See
Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to
Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1767 n.27
(1992).
74. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bar-
gaining Between Patients andHealth Care Providers, 51 U. PiT. L. REV. 365, 370
(1990). In fact, employees typically receive only a summary of benefits, not the
plan itself.
75. About 48% of moderate and large employers reported offering only one
plan in the i1995 KPMG Peat Marwick Health Benefits Survey. Thirty-five percent
of moderate: and large employers offered three or more plans. Small employers are
less likely to offer a choice of plans, although many still offer indemnity insurance
instead of managed care plans. See Lynn Etheredge et al., What Is Driving Health
System Change?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 93, 94. See also Atul A. Ga-
wande et al., Does Dissatisfaction With Health Plans Stem From Having No
Choice?, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 184, 187 (noting that 42% of those
insured through either their employer or spouse have no choice of health plans).
76. See generally Jon R. Gabel et al., Small Employers and Their Health
Benefits, 1988-1996: An Awkward Adolescence, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at
103 (analyzing KPMG Peat Marwick survey on small employer utilization of
health care p.,lans); see also generally John R. Gabel et al., When Employers Choose
Health Planzs, Do NCQA Accreditation and HEDIS Data Count? (Sept. 1998)
<http://www.cmwf.orgprograms/health_care/abelncqahedis293.asp> (noting
that only five percent of employers reported HEDIS data as "very important" in
selecting an HMO for their employees; only one percent of employers provided any
HEDIS dat i to their employees).
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plans- with low premiums, with little attention to quality. 77 The Health
Plan and Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), 78 developed by
large employers with the National Committee for Quality Assurance, is
a welcome attempt to evaluate the quality of care provided by health
plans. Unfortunately, the information's utility is limited. It relies pri-
marily on counting the number of members who receive relatively sim-
ple procedures like mammograms and immunizations. Patients are more
likely to want information about how plans treat diabetes, different
forms of cancer, and other complicated conditions. However, it is diffi-
cult to measure quality in such cases because of the differences in stan-
dards of practice in different locations, and the fact that therapeutic
standards are often a moving target. Thus, employers who want to assure
their employees of good quality health care find it hard to obtain useful
comparative information.
Thus, managed care contracts do not fit the idealized competitive
market model of a voluntary negotiated agreement between two indi-
viduals of equal bargaining power for mutually beneficial trade; the
contract is not necessarily voluntary, nor does the individual negotiate it.
Indeed, in group health plans, the contract is not between individuals at
all, but between companies. The individual has no bargaining power and
little awareness of the bargaining process. The result is often "member-
ship" in an off-the-shelf standard form plan about which the individual
knows little more than the price and rudimentary information about
benefits and exclusions. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that
consumer choice can, or will, play the role expected of it in managed
care.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CONTRACT MODEL
Managed care brought together elements of health insurance and pa-
tient care that traditionally have been handled separately by the law.
Most courts that have reviewed disputes between patients and managed
care organizations have felt constrained to categorize the issues for deci-
sion as either wholly contract issues or wholly tort issues.79 This has
proved particularly problematic in cases involving benefit decisions that
77. See Mehlman, supra note 74, at 376.
78. For a full description of HEDIS, see National Committee for Quality
Assurance (visited Dec. 2, 1998) <http:\\www.ncqa.org>.
79. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th
Cir. 1992).
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influence the nature of patient care, because benefit decisions are typi-
cally governed by contract, while patient care decisions are typically
governed by tort law.
In Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 8 the
Eighth Circuit faced the question of whether the choice of a particular
hospital should be considered a decision about covered benefits under a
health plan contract or a decision about the quality of care to be pro-
vided.8' In April 1989, Buddy Kuhl had a heart attack. All the physi-
cians who examined him agreed that he should have surgery at Barnes
Hospital irt St. Louis because the hospitals in Kansas City did not have
adequate equipment for the surgery.82 Kuhl's health plan, however, was
located in Kansas City, and would not authorize the surgery to be per-
formed at Barnes because Barnes hospital was not in its network of par-
ticipating providers. 3 In July, the plan reversed its decision, but the
Barnes surgical team was not available until September. 84 By then,
Kuhl's heart deteriorated to the point where surgery was no longer pos-
sible, and his physicians recommended a heart transplant to save his
life.85 Pre-' ertification for a transplant at Barnes was also denied, and
Kuhl died in December before his request for reconsideration was de-
cided.8' Kuhl's wife sued the plan for medical malpractice, claiming that
the plan wrongfully delayed heart surgery.8 7 The court of appeals found
that there was no valid malpractice claim because the plan did not make
80. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
81. See id. at 302. The primary legal issue was whether Kuhl's wife's mal-
practice claim was preempted by ERISA, but resolution of that issue required de-
termining whether the health plan made a medical decision, which would be judged
according to negligence standards in state court, or merely denied a claim for bene-
fits under a employee group contract, which would be governed by ERISA. See
id. at 304.
82. See id. at 300. Kuhl's plan physicians found that Kuhl was at risk for
sudden death from ventricular tachycardia and recommended bypass surgery to-
gether with electrophysiologically guided left ventricular aneurysm resection and
subendocardial resection, all needed within a few weeks. See id The health plan's
participating cardiologists and cardiac surgeon agreed that their hospitals did not
have the necessary equipment and that no physician in Kansas City had as much





87. See Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 300.
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a medical decision. Instead, it characterized the suit as a claim for denial
of benefits or improperly processing a claim for benefits defined by the
group health plan.88
The court's decision is unsatisfying because it fails to recognize the
medical treatment choices imbedded in the plan's actions. Both the pa-
tient's medical condition and the recommended surgery were conced-
edly covered as part of the plan's benefits. Thus, the plan did not deny
the benefit itself. The plan's objection was not to the surgery, but who
performed it and where. A responsible plan would undoubtedly consider
the quality of care in selecting a hospital to provide surgery for its mem-
bers. Thus, the plan's choice of hospital entails a representation that it
will provide good care for a patient. At the very least, the plan's deci-
sion has elements of medical judgment for a covered benefit. Like the
Lincoln National Health Plan, many health plans limit the providers who
care for their patients in order to control both the cost and quality of
care. Decisions about how to provide care may share some procedures
with decisions about whether a condition or treatment is a covered bene-
fit, but they are also decisions about the quality of care. Medical deci-
sions are often so entangled with benefit decisions that any distinction
between the two appears artificial.
The mixed nature of many managed care decisions blurs the boundary
between medical and benefit decisions that courts use to classify legal
claims. By and large, benefit decisions have been judged according to
contract law, while tort law governed medical decisions. But just as it is
difficult to distinguish benefit decisions from medical decisions in man-
aged care, it is often impossible to neatly separate contractual issues
from tort issues in managed care disputes. An insurer's obligation to
decide claims in good faith, for example, is an extra-contractual duty
enforceable by a tort cause of action on the part of an insured. These
duties, however, are limited to the insurer's actions in deciding whether
a claim qualifies as a covered benefit.
Managed care goes further. It has imported into its contracts service
88. See id at 303. The effect of that decision was to dismiss any state law
claim for malpractice. Kuhl's family could bring a claim for nonpayment of bene-
fits under ERISA. However, even if successful, the remedy would be limited to the
cost of the benefit itself and exclude any damages for personal injury. For a dis-
cussion of the effect of ERISA on negligence claims against managed care plans,
see generally Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 863 (1996).
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obligations: and standards of professional conduct ordinarily governed
by tort law. Managed care plans sometimes offer services directly to
their members, such as advice and assistance in selecting particular phy-
sicians, hospitals, and treatment. They may encourage members to use
the plan's preventive care services and exercise club activities. In addi-
tion, they select and monitor physicians, hospitals, and other service
providers that their members use.89 They may also specify a drug for-
mula to be: used by providers. The methods used to pay providers may
create incentives to recommend particular treatments and not others.
90
Paradoxically, then, contractual provisions affect the type and quality of
care provided to patients, and tort standards govern the services pro-
vided as insurance benefits. It is becoming impossible to characterize
components of managed care as wholly contractual or wholly tort, which
makes it quite difficult to determine which body of law governs.
If all managed care decisions are benefit decisions governed by con-
tract, then it is impossible to hold the health plan accountable for its
influence on the quality of care provided to the patient. For example,
suppose that a managed care plan covers services provided only by phy-
sicians that it has selected to be in its network. For several years, a pa-
tient with a recurrent cough is seen by a network physician who negli-
gently fails to diagnose lung cancer until the patient is terminally ill.
Under the benefit/quality-of-care distinction, the plan satisfied its obli-
gations to the patient to provide covered benefits by paying for visits to
its participating physician. Although the patient's estate may have a
cause of action for negligence against the physician, it will have no case
against the health care plan even though the patient's choice of physi-
cian was influenced by the fact that the plan selects and pays for that
physician's services. The patient might have made the effort to see an-
other physician outside the network, but that option would have ap-
peared unnecessary because treatment was a covered benefit. The pa-
89. See generally John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing
into Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173 (1996); Mark
A. Kadzielski et al., Credentialing for Managed Care Providers: Risks and Op-
portunities, 18 WHITIER L. REV. 87 (1996).
90. For a description of the types of incentive compensation methods in use,
see generally Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Man-
aged-Care Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678 (1995). For
a summary of concerns about the effect of financial incentives on physician be-
havior, see generally Barry R. Furrow, Incentivizing Medical Practice: What (If
Anything) Happens to Professionalism, 1 WIDENER. L. SYMP. 1. 1 (1996).
1998]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
tient's right to obtain medical care that meets acceptable medical stan-
dards was affected by the plan's selection of a limited network of physi-
cians to provide covered benefits. A plan has a responsibility to ensure
that its physicians are competent and provide acceptable medical care
for covered medical conditions.91 This is a tort obligation, but it arises
out of the plan's contractual obligations to the patient.
Several commentators argue that individuals should be free to agree to
a lower standard of care in return for paying a lower premium or fee.
This, in effect, waives their right to bring a negligence suit for substan-
dard care.92 Arguments against permitting such contracts include the
patient's relative lack of bargaining power and the difficulty of appreci-
ating what a lower or different standard of care might mean. But such
proposals raise the broader question of whether contract provisions
should supersede any and all patient rights grounded in tort.
For example, suppose that a patient refuses a recommended amputa-
tion to stop a gangrenous infection, and therefore requires a lengthy
hospitalization.93 Could the patient's health plan refuse to cover the hos-
pitalization on the ground that it is not medically necessary and there-
fore not a covered benefit? The patient might have avoided hospitaliza-
tion had he agreed to amputation, and the plan would have avoided the
resulting expense. But the insurance contract should not override the
patient's right to refuse treatment. If the plan properly upholds the pa-
tient's refusal, can it still deny coverage of the hospitalization? What if
the contract provides it will pay only for treatment that it has pre-
authorized as medically appropriate, and that other forms of treatment
will not be covered? As long as the treatment options are medically ac-
ceptable, patients who exercise their right to refuse treatment should not
be penalized by forfeiting their benefit coverage.
There are many examples of the ways that tort-based patient rights
and contract-based health plan rights can interact and conflict in man-
aged care. Patient rights to confidentiality of their medical information
91. If a plan acts with reasonable diligence and the physician is indeed com-
petent, but makes a negligent error, the plan would have no liability to the patient,
unless the physician were the plan's employee or agent. See-generally Barry R.
Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31
GA. L. REV. 419 (1997). For the early development of corporate liability in man-
aged care, see generally John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health
Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 191 (1989).
92. See discussion supra note 38.
93. See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
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are often affected by insurance contracts. Employers may obtain patient
records to monitor health plan costs for their employees. 94 But disclo-
sure of personal medical information violates a patient's right to confi-
dentiality. Contract provisions requiring patient consent to disclosure
effectively vitiate this right.
For many years, courts insisted that buyers have an obligation to read
the terms of their contracts and are bound by them whether they read
them or not.95 During the 1960s and 1970s, many courts and commen-
tators found that classical contract law theory failed to capture the real-
ity of agreements or their performance, and, as a result, the courts fash-
ioned more flexible standards for interpreting contractual obligations.
96
Many courts have claimed to interpret provisions in light of the parties'
expectations. 97 Others allowed the parties' deeds or oral representations
to modify contractual obligations on the ground that the actions spoke
louder than written words.98 However, there has been little judicial
challenge to the premise that the goal is to interpret the contract itself,
not to require the contract to conform to any broader goals of social
policy. Moreover, the past decade reveals evidence that courts may be
returning to a more classical approach to deciding contract cases.99 This
94. See Doe v. Southeastern Penn. Trans. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133 (3rd Cir.
1995).
95. Meyerson criticizes such decisions on the ground that "[c]ourts should
not presume something they know is untrue." Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunifi-
cation of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1263, 1326 n.40 (1993). As to the resulting law, he notes, "[i]f it is
both unreasonable and undesirable to have consumers read these [standard] terms,
courts should not fashion legal rules in a futile attempt to force consumers to read
these terms or to punish those who do not." Id. at 1270.
96. Not coincidentally, many of the first consumer protection laws were
adopted during the same period. See Rodwin, supra note 10, at 1333.
97. Professor Keeton may have been the first to suggest that one of the uni-
fying principles underlying seemingly inconsistent court decisions was that the
reasonable expectations of the parties to an insurance contract would be enforced
even where: the policy language dictated a different result. See Robert E. Keeton,
Insurance Law at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L; REV. 961, 967
(1970).
98. S uch exceptions to the parole evidence rule, however, have been some-
what limited in application.
99. See Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74
OR. L. REv. 1131, 1189 (1995) (arguing that courts have resurrected much of clas-
sical contract law's abstract and formal rules, emphasizing "freedom of contract"
and marketplace economics, and that such rules have tended to favor large eco-
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includes perpetuating the untenable assumption that people know and
understand all the terms and conditions of a written agreement, and
therefore, have agreed to them and should be bound by them.
Several scholars used classical contract theory to argue that patients
should be bound by exclusions and limitations in their health insurance
contracts. 00 The argument is usually part of a strategy to reduce health
care costs by reducing the demand for health care covered by insurance.
It is assumed that when patients get sick, they often want medical care
that is not covered by their health insurance contract and that courts of-
ten grant coverage in spite of contract exclusions.' 0 ' The remedy is bet-
ter enforcement of contractual limitations. This is sometimes justified as
upholding the individual patient's "freedom" to choose a cheaper health
nomically powerful entities, including banks, employers, and insurance compa-
nies). For earlier predictions of the same trend, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Develop-
ments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
203, 216 (1990); Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rise
from the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 483, 534 (1994). A
similar retrenchment can be seen in tort law. See Thoedore Eisenberg & James A.
Henderson, Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV.
731,788 (1992).
100. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assess-
ment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1647 (1992); Havighurst,
supra note 73, at 1764.
101. The degree to which courts actually favor insured plaintiffs in benefit
disputes is a matter of some controversy. Although both insured individuals and
insurers can point to specific horror stories, the court decisions do not demonstrate
any uniform bias. Hall studied 203 published decisions on medical necessity is-
sued from 1960 to 1994 and found patients won in thirty-nine percent of federal
appeals and 62% of state appeals. The results varied based on the type of insur-
ance, with plaintiffs winning 54% of all private insurance cases, 70% of public
benefit program court decisions, and 31% of government employee health insur-
ance cases. Insurer discretion to interpret the contract produced marked differ-
ences, with plaintiffs winning 80% of cases in which the insurer did not reserve the
discretion to interpret the contract, and 37 % of cases in which the insurer did re-
serve discretion. See Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care
Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1996); see also Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance
Industry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme
Courts' Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith and
Excess-Judgment Decisions, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 377 (1992) (finding differ-
ent results in courts in different parts of the country).
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plan with :Fewer benefits.10 2 Insurers would then be justified in refusing
care that i:s not covered because the limitations were freely and ration-
ally agreed to by both parties to the contract.
This argument carries an eerie echo of Lochner v. State of New York'
03
in which "freedom of contract" was used to justify enforcing contracts
of adhesion against employees. 1°4 Long ago, Professor Freidrich Kessler
warned of the dangers of such freedom:
Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guarantee
that all members of the community will be able to make use of it
to the same extent. On the contrary, the law, by protecting the
unequal distribution of property, does nothing to prevent free-
dom of contract from becoming a one-sided privilege. Society,
by proclaiming freedom of contract, guarantees that it will not
interfere with the exercise of power by contract. Freedom of
contract enables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is
even more important, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian
manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.
Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective in-
struments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial
overlo:rds enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their
own making upon a vast host of vassals. 05
Fears of such overreaching may motivate public backlash against
managed care. Even if such fears have no foundation, they undergird
strong resistance to blind enforcement of'contracts. Where courts de-
clined to enforce contract limitations, they sometimes resorted to unper-
suasive textual interpretations, finding ambiguity where there was none,
or questiounable applications of consumer expectation theories to avoid
serious harm or expense to patients. Such interpretations only highlight
the lack of fit between contract doctrines and managed care problems.
Too often,, patient concerns have little to do with how to interpret the
contract. Rather, they arise from contract provisions of which patients
were not aware and, when discovered, find unfair. Consumer protection
102. Havighurst has argued that health plans "should therefore be alert for
opportunities to assist consumers in economizing by surrendering legal rights that
systematically induce or excuse excessive spending by physicians." Havighurst,
supra note 73, at 1794.
103. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that the limitation of employment in
bakeries to ,60 hours a week and 10 hours a day is an arbitrary interference with the
freedom to :ontract guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution).
104. See id
105. Kessler, supra note 16, at 640.
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laws provided some counterweight to the theory of freedom of con-
tract's potential for private authoritarianism. However, legislation de-
signed to remedy contract issues alone did not address the concerns of
patients in managed care. Future law governing managed care, therefore,
cannot be limited exclusively to contract.
At the same time, patients cannot expect managed care plans to pro-
vide whatever a patient might want, without regard to quality, effective-
ness, or cost. Unlimited health care is not a realistic option. Patients may
expect more care than can or should reasonably be provided in some
circumstances.10 6 After years of public debate over health care costs, the
public may be beginning to appreciate the cost of unlimited care. Nev-
ertheless, individuals are likely to perceive a virtually unlimited need for
care when they or their loved ones are sick. 10 7 Even if they decide to
forgo some kinds of care, they may rightly expect to have the choice.
This means that they are likely to expect that their insurance covers the
care that their physician recommends and they accept. When people are
sick, they act like patients, not consumers, and they may not be willing
to hear that a health plan contract excludes the care. 08
Although patient rights do not include rights to unlimited care, they
simply do not address financial or resource issues. Tort law deals with
standards of care, not the cost of care. Tort law recognized patient rights
106. Annas cautions that patients cannot be condemned for expecting and
demanding more and better medical care. For decades, physicians and hospitals
fostered the notion that their services were necessary and valuable, and the more
technologically advanced, and expensive, the better. Traditional indemnity insur-
ance did little to counter such impressions until relatively recently. In many re-
spects, the health care system reaped what it sowed. At the same time, patients do
not always demand more care. A recurrent theme in the patient rights arena was
the resistance some patients and their families meet when they refused care. See
STANDARD OF CARE, supra note 1, at 215.
107. No one disputes the American romance with medical care, or the
tendency to demand whatever is possible to treat an illness, especially a potentially
fatal illness. There is a wealth of literature debating the causes of, and possible
solutions to, increasing demand for medical care. For a comprehensive discussion,
see DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS
(1990). For an social and psychological analysis of Americans' focus on health,
see ARTHUR J. BARSKY, WORRIED SICK: OUR TROUBLED QUEST FOR WELLNESS
(1988).
108. Annas noted that "there is no possibility of containing costs (and thus
making quality medical care available to all Americans) unless we can come to
grips with our mortality." STANDARD OF CARE, supra note 1, at 214-15.
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to make decisions about their own cire and Americans cherish this right
as part of their autonomy. Annas correctly points out that to argue
against individual self-determination is to argue against the most fun-
damental value of the American political system.'0 9 Arguments based in
contract alone are not likely to be persuasive.
This suggests that, by itself, neither contract nor tort offers a suffi-
cient or salisfactory basis for defining the array of legal rights and obli-
gations ari:;ing out of managed care plans. Moreover, the interaction of
tort and contract issues in managed care argues against picking one or
the other to control a mixed issue. Managed care creates both contract
and tort relationships with consumers who become patients. Contracts
are a usefid way to regulate financial transactions. Tort law is better
suited to defining rights and obligations in personal and professional
relationships. Yet, the line dividing contract and tort in managed care is
as permeable as the line dividing decisions about benefits and the qual-
ity of care. Standards for judging managed care must account for its in-
surance and financial performance as well as it provision of services.
This will require a new synthesis of the law applicable to managed care
decisions.
VI. TOWARD A HYBRID STANDARD FOR MANAGED CARE
If the law is to provide a more realistic and credible basis for judging
managed care, it must begin by recognizing that managed care contracts
have elements of both standard form insurance contracts, and contracts
for personal and professional services. Each of these has somewhat dif-
ferent implications for interpreting managed care obligations than the
idealized contract often held up as the model.
Althougli public debate over managed care often refers to the impor-
tance of the contract, there is surprisingly little discussion of the fact
that the contract is a standard form contract.10 Group health insurance
plans are necessarily standard form contracts because the contract must
be the same for all employees in the group."' Among the advantages of
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 205 N.W.2d 152,
155 (Wis. 1973) ("Contracts of insurance rest upon and are controlled by the same
principles of law that are applicable to other contracts.").
111. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of .awmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (noting that
standard form contracts have become an integral part of our mass-production soci-
1998)
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
standard form contracts is the efficiency of administering consistent
terms and procedures." 2 Yet this useful consistency means that there is
little point for consumers to read a standard form contract. Indeed, com-
panies do not expect consumers to read all the provisions in a standard
form contract and probably do not want them to do so. 
13
Insurance contracts are a special category of standard form
contracts.114 Instead of delivering a commodity, like a car or a loan,
when the contract is made, the seller delivers a promise to pay if and
when a designated contingency materializes. "5 An insurance contract or
policy creates a relationship between insurer and insured, instead of
ending a transaction between buyer and seller. In managed care relation-
ships, the insurer promises not merely to make payments in the event of
future illness, but to arrange for medical care throughout the contract
period. Indeed, care is provided to the insured, while payment is made to
physicians and other caretakers. Moreover, the care typically includes
periodic examinations and preventive services that the insured is ex-
pected to use. Unlike indemnity insurance, managed care companies
assume that almost all their members will, and should, regularly take
ety).
112. Advantages include promoting efficiency by allowing companies to
complete numerous small transactions quickly and administer them uniformly. It
would be impossibly expensive and time consuming to expect every customer to
negotiate every detail of a bank loan, lease, or insurance policy. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981), notes that "[o]ne of the purposes of
standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of individual transactions,
and that purpose would not be served if a substantial number of customers retained
counsel and reviewed the standard terms." Id. In addition, standard provisions can
acquire reliable consistency of meaning by repeated use, or by judicial interpreta-
tion. See also Kessler, supra note 16, at 631 ("The standard clauses in insurance
policies are the most striking illustrations of successful attempts on the part of
business enterprises to select and control risks assumed under a contract.").
113. See Meyerson, supra note 95, at 1270; see also Keeton, supra note
97, at 968 (noting that "insurers know that ordinarily policyholders will not in fact
read their policies.");.
114. For a general discussion of the formation of insurance contracts, see
BERTRAM HARNETr & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE (1995).
115. This promise of future payment for which a consumer has already
paid justifies regulating the financial solvency of insurance companies. There is no
comparable regulation to ensure that car manufacturers, for example, stay in busi-
ness.
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advantage of certain services, like periodic check-ups and immuniza-
tions. Thus, the managed care contract creates an ongoing relationship
for the provision of professional services.
Managed care plans create relationships, but individuals rarely select
the seller/insurer or negotiate the contract terms. Even if individuals can
choose among different health plans, there is little variation in standard
terms offered by different companies, so that choices may be even more
limited thEn they appear. Most important, individuals never see the in-
surance contract before they agree to it and pay the first premium."
6
Indeed, employees in group health plans may only receive a plan sum-
mary and never see the governing contract itself.1 7 The failure to re-
ceive a copy of the contract makes it difficult to claim that the insured
willingly agreed to each and every term and condition.' 18
For these reasons, courts have ordinarily treated insurance policies, at
least those covering individuals, as contracts of adhesion." 9 The one-
116. See Keeton, supra note 97, at 968. The practice of withholding deliv-
ery until after the insured is committed is common - for all types of insurance,
including homeowners, automobile, life and health insurance. In fact, few indi-
viduals comider it remarkable. See Deborah Stone, Promises and Public Trust:
Rethinking Isurance Law Through Stories, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1435, 1438 (1994). In
addition, insurers typically structure the process of entering into an insurance con-
tract in such a way that the individual must make the initial "offer" by submitting
an application for insurance, which the insurer "accepts" to form the contract. See
MALCOM CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE, 68. (1997).
117. In some cases, the governing contract may not even be reduced to
writing beyond a certificate of coverages. See, e.g., Wells v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
118. Standard form contracts have often posed problems for contract law
because the), deviate from the hypothetical one-on-one contract between a willing
buyer and a willing seller that served as the foundational premise for an enforce-
able contract The assumption that the buyer agreed to all the terms and conditions
of a standard form contract is often, if not always, unfounded. See, e.g., Meyerson,
supra note 95, at 1265, 1269-70. If the justification for enforcing contract terms
against a buyer is his or her acceptance of those terms, the absence of acceptance
should render the contract void.
119. See Keeton, supra note 97, at 967. Jones, Farnsworth and Young
note that the term "contrat d'adhesion" was coined by Saleilles. The term was
imported from France by American scholars who studied abroad, and was first used
in the United States to describe an insurance policy by Edwin Patterson. See Ed-
win W. Patterson, The Delivery ofa Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REv. 198,
111 (1919). Saleilles described the contrat d'adhesion as a contract "in which one
predominant unilateral will dictates its law to an undetermined multitude rather
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sided nature of a contract of adhesion has encouraged application of
doctrines like contra proferentum,120 and the good faith requirement,
which holds insurers liable for bad faith denials of claims.' 21 The one-
sided nature of contracts of adhesion also provides the justification for
state legislation regulating the form, and occasionally, the content of
insurance policies, including requirements for specific "mandated bene-
than to an individual . . . ." RAYMOND" SALEILLES, DE LA DECLARATION DE
VOLONTE 229 (1901); HARRY W. JONES ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 151 n.b (1965). Earlier, Kessler described standard form contracts as
contracts of adhesion:
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong
bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or
services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better
terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a mo-
nopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitor use the
same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or
less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms Whose
consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all.
Thus, standardized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion;
they are a prendre ou a laisser. Notinfrequently the weaker party
to a prospective contract even agrees in advance not to retract his
offer while the offeree reserves for him self the power to accept or
refuise; or he submits to terms or change of terms which will be
communicated to him later.
Kessler, supra note 16, at 632. This remains a remarkably accurate portrayal of
standard form contracts, with particular application to group health insurance con-
tracts.
120. Literally, "[a]gainst the party who proffers or puts forward a thing."
As a rule, the doctrine requires that "a contract be construed against a person pre-
paring terms thereof." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990). In insur-
ance cases, ambiguous contract language may be construed against the insurer, who
writes the contract, and in favor of coverage. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham,
A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996).
121. See HARNETr & LESNICK, supra note 114, at 1401. Such doctrines are
sometimes applied in an apparent attempt to remedy an injustice arising out of
circumstances in which traditional contract assumptions do not hold without aban-
doning traditional contract principles. As several scholars note, the result is often
tortured or unconvincing. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Benefit Decisions in ERISA
Plans: Diminishing Deference to Fiduciaries and An Emerging Problem for Em-
ployer-Sponsored Organizations, 65 TENN. L. REV. 511, 516 (1998); Mark A. Hall
& Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1637, 1650-51 (1992). For example, in an effort to limit their intrusion
on the parties' freedom to contract to merely "interpreting" the contract - as op-
posed to imposing extracontractual duties - some courts found ambiguity where
the provisions were reasonably clear but the "bargain" was unfair. See Abraham,
supra note 120, at 531-32 (1996); Kessler, supra note 16, at 633.
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fits" in health insurance policies.
At a minimum, managed care contracts should be recognized as stan-
dard form insurance contracts of adhesion that are neither bargained for,
nor read by, the insured. But this characterization only captures part of
managed care. The benefits financed by insurance are professional
services, so that managed care contracts can also be understood as
agreements to provide professional services financed by insurance. This
characterization has several implications. Patients cannot be assumed to
read or understand any contract provision unless it was specifically
drawn to their attention by the insurer and explained to them. This has
the virtue, as well as the vice, of respecting reality. It means, however,
that there must be extracontractual standards for determining what the
contract requires. Although courts have not been willing or able to de-
velop such standardsi a recent case illustrates why such standards are
necessary.
In Engafla v. Permanente Group, Inc., 1 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia fouad that a binding arbitration clause could not be enforced
automatically against a member of a Kaiser Permanente Health Plan
because of the plan's fraud in inducing acceptance of the arbitration
clause. 123 Wilfredo Engalla submitted a claim of malpractice against
Kaiser for failure to diagnose lung cancer.124 Engalla's health plan re-
quired arbitration of the claim and Engalla and his famiiy initiated arbi-
tration proceedings in May 1991.125 Kaiser, however, delayed the pro-
ceedings until after Engalla died in October. 26 Finally, the Engallas
sued Kais:r in state court in February 1992, claiming fraud in the in-
ducement of the agreement to arbitrate. 127 Kaiser then sought to compel
arbitration and limit potential damages to a lesser amount as a result of
Engalla's death.128 The California Supreme Court found ample evidence
to support a claim that Kaiser misrepresented its arbitration process as
122. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
123. See id. at 916. Plaintiffs also claimed that the defendant's dilatory
actions in pursing the arbitration constituted a waiver of its right to enforce arbitra-
tion. Because the trial court made no findings on this claim, the Supreme Court
remanded to permit the trial court to do so. See id. at 922.
124. See id. at 909.
125. See id
126. See id. at 910-12.
127. See id. at 914.
128. See id.
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one that functioned efficiently. 129 The court said, "[T]here is evidence
that Kaiser established a self-administered arbitration system in which
delay for its own benefit and convenience was an inherent part, despite
express and implied contractual representations to the contrary."'
130
To establish fraud in the inducement, however, the Engallas had to
show that this misrepresentation was a material factor in concluding the
agreement.13 1 It was Engalla's employer, of course, that contracted with
Kaiser. Engalla received documents stating only that plan members'
claims must be submitted to arbitration "if the [health plan] agreement
so provides.",3 It is unlikely that, when he enrolled, Engalla was aware
of any arbitration agreement. The court, however, found that an efficient
arbitration system was likely to be material to his employer. 33 The em-
ployer was bound to act as the employees' agent in negotiating group
health insurance, and therefore had a fiduciary duty to act in the em-
ployees' interests.1 34 Thus, the employer may have sought an efficient
arbitration process to further its employees' interests.
1 35
129. The opinion included a lengthy summary of the facts "[b]ecause the
nature of this case cannot be appreciated without a detailed understanding of its
factual context.. . ." Id at 908. Unlike many health plans, Kaiser administered its
own arbitration cases, using outside legal counsel to control the selection of arbi-
trators and the timing of events. See id, A survey of Kaiser arbitrations between
1984 and 1986 showed that, on average, a neutral arbitrator was appointed to begin
the process 674 days, almost two years, after a patient's demand for arbitration.
See id at 913. The health plan agreements required the appointment within sixty
days, but only one percent of cases met that target. See id. The average time to a
hearing was 863 days, almost two and a half years. See id. Moreover, there was
ample evidence that Kaiser was well aware of these delays. See id.; see also Mi-
chael A. Hiltzik & David Olmos, "Kaiser Justice": System's Fairness is Ques-
tioned, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at Al (suggesting that the company's frequent
use of arbitration makes it difficult for arbitrators who decide cases against Kaiser
to get jobs).
130. Engalla, 938 P.2d at 918.
131. See id. at 919.
132. Id. at 908 (quoting Engalla's enrollment form).
133. Engalla's employer conceded that it did not really care whether there
was an arbitration clause in its health plan, although it sort of looked with favor on
a good arbitration process. See id. at 920.
134. See id. at 919 (citing Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 552 P.2d
1178, 1181-82 (Cal. 1976); Fischer v. Machado, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1069, 1072 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996)).
135. The Court did not completely depart from its prior holding that arbi-
tration agreements between an HMO and its members are not inherently one-sided
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The California Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evi-
dence that Kaiser misrepresented its one-sided arbitration system and
denied Kaiser's petition to compel arbitration. 136 This avoided directly
confronting the problem of whether to enforce agreements included in
contracts accepted by employers on behalf of their employees when em-
ployees have no knowledge of the agreement. The court simply assumed
that employers act in their employees' interests in negotiating such
agreements. In a footnote, however, the court noted that if an employer
does not act in its employees' interest, "then an employee bound by an
arbitration agreement of which he was scarcely aware could well raise a
claim that such agreement was unconscionable."
137
In reality, almost all members of managed care plans are "scarcely
aware" of provisions like arbitration clauses. Managed care contracts
contain too many procedural details and cannot be expected to specify
the benefits offered in sufficient detail to enable an individual to predict
what kind of treatment might be covered in the future. Thus, both man-
aged care organizations and individuals would benefit from extracon-
tractual standards for determining what provisions should be enforced
and how to interpret enforceable provisions that individuals are not ex-
pected to read or that cannot specify their precise coverage in sufficient
detail to p:rmit reliable predictions.
The need for a reasonable, objective standard against which to meas-
ure benefit coverage is particularly acute in health insurance cases. It is
not always clear what the contract covers. 138 The description of benefits
in favor of the HMO. See Madden, 552 P.2d at 1186. Recent California decisions
strongly favored arbitration for its potential for speed, efficiency and, possibly,
keeping cases out of court. See, e.g., id. Like many states, California law mirrors
much of the Federal Arbitration Act. See Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh,
Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251,256-58 (Cal. 1983).
136. This may be a departure from recent California decisions in contract
cases, which have used a formalistic approach to enforce the literal terms of a con-
tract, with little or no allowance for representations or conduct that contradicts the
writing. See Engalla, 938 P.2d at 919.
137. Id at 919 n.1 1. Although the court attempted to distinguish between
arbitration as it should be and Kaiser's misuse of arbitration in Engalla's case, in
practice, it may be difficult to find the ideal arbitration that the court system seems
to expect.
138. Contracts are drafted in legal language which, even if clear to lawyers
and judges, can be misunderstood by laypeople. State laws requiring insurance
contracts to be written in "plain English" may be difficult to interpret, since plain
English may sacrifice the use of words whose meaning is settled in law, thereby
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are typically and necessarily in general language, such as inpatient hos-
pital care, physicians' services, and laboratory services. Furthermore,
benefits are often limited to services that are "medically necessary" or
"appropriate."'139 Unlike most insurance that pays monetary benefits in
the event of a defined loss, the benefits covered by managed care are
intended to be limited to particular medical services. Yet, it would be
too difficult to specify each and every service in advance in the contract
itself. This means that many benefits are necessarily open to speculation
or at least different expectations on the part of the insurer and the in-
sured. Finally, when the individual needs the services, both parties to the
contract may have little incentive to abide by their earlier agreement.
The insurer has little financial incentive to pay benefits that deplete its
revenues, while patients have little incentive to forego care for which
their premiums have already "paid."
Resdrt to traditional conceptions of consumer expectations or even
reasonable consumer expectations applicable in indemnity insurance
cases is unsatisfactory. The insured's expectations are often influenced
by advertising or summary descriptions of a health plan's benefits. In-
surance sales pitches often promise "security" rather than a specific list
of dollar payments for particular losses. 140 Insurers may characterize the
policy as promising security, freedom from fear, peace of mind, trust,
and, in the case of health insurance, the finest quality of care.' 41 Such
throwing doubt on the coverage intended. See CLARKE, supra note 116, at 121-24.
139. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Patients' Rights after Health Care
Reform: Who Decides What Is Medically Necessary?, 84 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 1515
(1994) (discussing the difficulty of determining what is medically necessary).
140. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Sto-
ries, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1395,
1426 (1994). Baker argues that these marketing promises should be used to resolve
disputes over coverage and that damages for breach of contract should include an
award for the emotional distress caused by the insurer's failure to pay a claim that
its advertising appeared to promise. See id. at 1426-28; see also Robert H. Jerry II,
Remedying Insurers' Bad Faith Contract Performance: A Reassessment, 18 CONN.
L. REv. 271 (1986) (arguing that actions against insurance companies for bad faith
failure to pay claims could be replaced by expanding the scope of damages avail-
able in ordinary breach of contract actions).
141. See McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla.
1981) ("[O]ne of the primary reasons a consumer purchases any type of insurance
(and the insurance industry knows this) is the peace of mind and security that it
provides in the event of loss.").
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images are reassuring and probably just what a consumer seeks. 142 How-
ever, when the insured makes a glaim or seeks health care, peace of
mind is never a covered benefit. Coverage is limited to specific condi-
tions described in the contract.
A contract solution would be to use advertising as evidence of addi-
tional promises which modify the written contract. However, as Deborah
Stone suggests, a mere reinterpretation of the contract itself, even sup-
plemented by advertising, cannot resolve the tension inherent in the re-
lationship between insurer and insured. 143 The shock sometimes experi-
enced by :he insured is only partly attributable to reassuring advertising
and a failure to read the fine print. Insurers and patients typically bring
quite diffirent expectations to the relationship. 44 Insurers are in the
business cf spreading financial risk by carefully calculating the nature of
the risk insured, the probability of its occurrence, and its likely cost.
Even a minimally profitable business requires insurers to think in highly
specific terms; specific risks are covered for specific losses in specific
circumstances. In contrast, outside of business, individuals do not neces-
sarily think about insuring specific risks. Instead, they expect care when
a feared risk materializes. Also, the risk of illness or injury is different
in kind than the risk of financial loss covered by property insurance.
Thus, while managed care organizations may think like insurers when it
comes time to pay benefits, insureds who are sick are likely to think like
patients. Although insurers and economists may expect or wish people
to behave like rational economic beings, such beings may not exist in a
health insurance pool, if they exist at all.
4 1
The different assumptions that insurers and patients bring to any dis-
pute argue3 against using either tort or contract law as the sole basis for
142. See CLARKE, supra note 116, at 33. Malcolm Clarke notes that "the
insured seeks insurance, in part at least, to find some degree of peace of mind con-
cerning the risk insured. Insurers are aware of this and, to sell their insurance, have
projected a certain image of themselves and of their products." Id Television and
print advertising of managed care plans often display images of happy, healthy
individuals romping in meadows and celebrating with their families. Even given
the brief number of seconds or space allotted for such advertising, there is no indi-
cation that the product being sold is a series of payments or services for defined
circumstances.
143. See generally Stone, supra note 116.
144. See generally Leslie P. Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to
Health Care, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1881 (1992) (discussing consumer expectations).
145. See CLARKE, supra note 116, at 6 (footnote omitted).
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determining benefit coverage. The consumer expectations standard that
is often applied in cases involving standard form contracts for consumer
products is difficult to apply to managed care disputes. It is likely to be
impossible to discover what an individual consumer actually expected
when he or she first joined a managed care plan. Given the inevitable
generic language used to describe medical care and the impossibility of
predicting in advance what future care an individual might need, even a
reasonable consumer expectations standard appears inadequate. Moreo-
ver, when consumers become patients, their expectations are likely to
change and expand. The subjective expectations of patients who now
know what they need and want may be unreasonable.
One alternative to this dilemma would be to adopt a standard package
of benefits that would be publicly understood. However, the United
States has yet to agree on, much less adopt, such a package. Indeed, af-
ter the failure of health care reform proposals in 1994, managed care
promised to provide a variety of consumer products with benefits tai-
lored to meet the needs of different groups. Thus, it currently appears
that a uniform benefit package for all individuals is neither feasible nor
universally desired.
Another alternative would be to develop a common understanding of
what different types of benefits are encompassed in the coverage. There
is considerably more precedent for this approach. Most industrialized
countries have in place a system of national health insurance that covers
a wide array of benefits defined by statute. 4 6 But those definitions are
no more, and typically less, specific than the benefit definitions included
in American health insurance policies. Generic terms like physician
services and inpatient hospital services are used for the same reason they
are used by industry: itemization would be too lengthy and risk omitting
important services. Instead, many countries rely on developing a con-
sistent interpretation of what the benefits mean.
The same approach could be used to interpret benefit language in
managed care contracts. In order to incorporate financial limits on bene-
fits, it may be necessary to restrict benefit coverage to the types of
medical care that could reasonably be provided within resource con-
straints. But this should not mean that any and all contractual limits are
146. See generally, e.g., CHRISTOPHER NEWDICK, WHO SHOULD WE
TREAT? LAW, PATIENTS AND RESOURCES IN THE N.H.S. (1995); Gerard F. Ander-
son, In Search of Value: An International Comparison of Cost, Access and Out-
comes, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 163.
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acceptable,. Rather, the benefits should also comply with relevant tort
standards governing the quality of acceptable medical care and'admini-
stration. Thus, the health plan's obligations should be those that reason-
able managed care organizations, and reasonable patients, with equal
bargaining power and good information, would expect as fair and rea-
sonable for the stated price. This amounts to a revitalized doctrine of
informed reasonableness. It contains an element of tort in imposing ex-
tra-contractual standards on both the managed care organization and the
health plan contract itself. In addition, it contains an element of contract
in allowing contracts to specify financial limitations. It differs from cur-
rent notions of consumer expectations in removing the focus of reason-
ableness f'om the individual consumer and his or her individual experi-
ences. Instead, it focuses on the reasonableness of the resulting plan, as
well as the behavior of the managed care organization, by using the ad-
mittedly artificial concept of what would be expected by a well-
informed group of health plan members.1
47
Other proposals to adapt legal doctrines for managed care may be
equally suitable or compatible. 148 The important point is that it is no
longer tenable to insist that the resolution of managed care disputes be
governed by narrow legal doctrines that fail to account for managed
care's hybrid roots. Forcing inherently mixed issues into a single doc-
trinal straightjacket produces poor results or tortured reasoning without
offering the solace of either consistency or justice. There is an urgent
need for extra-contractual standards by which to establish and judge
both the content and operation of managed care plans. Standards gov-
erning pa:tient issues described above, including the nature of treatment
provided as part of covered benefits, should be solidly grounded in tort.
Consumer issues that are predominantly financial, such as co-payments,
treatment costs, and notification procedures, may draw upon contract
147. There may be a hint here of Gilmore's prediction that contract and
tort could merge, at least for the purpose of applying standards for managed care.
See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
148. See generally Mehlman, supra note 74 (fiduciary contracting); Mey-
erson, supra note 95 (extracontractual standards for standard form contracts); Jerry,
supra note 140 (expanded damages for breach of contract in lieu of claim for bad
faith denial! of insurance benefits); Brewbaker, supra note 15 (implied warranty of
quality). It would differ from Hall's theory of economic informed consent, how-
ever, because it does not assume that patients must consent to all decisions made
under the Etuspices of managed care plan simply because they are informed of the
benefits and exclusions covered by the plan. See HALL, supra note 9, at 211.
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law.
The use of such standards for interpreting benefits and other plan ob-
ligations should avoid the major problems associated with relying on
unrealistic, subjective, individual perceptions. Individuals should not be
surprised by arcane insurance industry practices of which they have no
knowledge. Informed and objectively reasonable expectations should
take account of patient needs, but they cannot encompass an unlimited
demand for inappropriate, incompetent,. or purely experimental care.
This approach also has the advantage of accommodating changes in
medical technology without requiring rewriting a contract. Currently,
since treatment options can change during the period of insurance, an
insurer may change the particular services for which it is willing to pay,
thereby effectively changing the benefit package without an individual's
knowledge. If benefits are not interpreted according to a reasonable
standard of what reasonable parties should expect as medical care, then,
in theory, this type of change might require an amendment to the con-
tract. Obviously, no such amendments are offered to insureds for their
approval due to impracticality. But it offers further support for applying
an extra-contractual standard to determine the type of medical care that
should be covered.
A revitalized reasonableness standard may help to overcome a fear
among some patients that limitations are being applied unfairly in indi-
vidual cases. If everyone can expect that benefits are being interpreted
according to the same standard, it may encourage more trust in the sys-
tem. In contrast, a focus on consumer choice may exacerbate the fear of
unfair or arbitrary denials of care.1 49 Where one health plan denies Smith
care that Jones receives under a different health plan for the same medi-
cal condition, Smith may feel that his health plan is acting arbitrarily or
unfairly. Unless there is an explicit and obvious difference in the two
149. It is difficult to expect patients to sacrifice what they perceive as nec-
essary care unless they are satisfied that their "sacrifice" is justified or at least
shared generally. This is particularly problematic when patients in one health plan
are denied services that are covered in another plan. The proliferation of compet-
ing health plans with different coverages and exclusions weighs against the devel-
opment of any sense of common "sacrifice" for the general good. See Wendy K.
Mariner, Rationing Health Care and the Need for Credible Scarcity: Why Ameri-
cans Can't Say No, 85 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1439, 1442 (1995). See generally
Normal Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States Is So Hard--Cost
Containment, Justice, and Provider Autonomy, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380
(1986).
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plans' coverage and price, it is likely to be difficult to justify such dif-
ferences in care. For example, if one plan explicitly covers organ trans-
plants and the other, cheaper plan does not, and the exclusion is made
clear to Smith before he joins, then the different treatment would be
both fair arid more acceptable.
Applicai' ion of a revitalized standard of reasonable expectations might
change the; result in some cases. For example, in the Kuhl case, it would
probably hold the health plan responsible for providing competent heart
surgery facilities for a patient in Kuhl's condition. This is because it is
reasonable to believe that both a responsible health plan and reasonable
health plan members would expect that covered benefits included com-
petent life-saving care for a heart condition that was susceptible to ef-
fective treatment. If no hospital in the health plan network were capable
of providing the necessary heart surgery competently, then the health
plan should be held accountable for failing to secure a capable hospital
and surgical team, and later for failing to authorize surgery at a capable
facility. In its defense, the health plan should be able to demonstrate that
its network hospitals were competent to perform the surgery. Then the
dispute would focus properly on the adequacy of the plan's resources for
providing care, rather than being summarily disposed of on the pretext
that the plan had no influence on the care selected. In addition, the stan-
dard would permit a health plan to exclude coverage of heart transplants,
for example, if the exclusion were properly drawn to the attention of all
plan members before they joined the plan.
Although a reasonable expectation standard should permit an analysis
of the merits of disputes, it would not necessarily change the result in
other cases. For example, in the often-cited case of Corcoran v. United
Healthcar,, Inc.,ISO a health plan's utilization review company rejected
the physician's recommendation that Florence Corcoran be hospitalized
to monitor her high risk pregnancy.151 Instead, it authorized ten hours
per day of home nursing care. The fetus suffered distress and died when
no nurse was on duty. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the
plan's actions involved medical decisions as well as a benefit determi-
nation, bul felt constrained to put those actions into one category, bene-
150. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
151. See id at 1322. This case was also decided on the health plan's claim
that the plaintiff's cause of action was preempted by ERISA because the plan's
action merely denied a benefit and did not amount to a medical decision. See id at
1329.
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fit determinations.15 2 Consequently, ERISA preempted the Corcoran's
state law negligence claim for the death of their baby in utero.15' Again,
the health plan did not deny that pregnancy care was a covered benefit.
The dispute centered on what type of care should have been provided as
part of that benefit. There was some evidence that the fetus was at risk
and needed monitoring. The prior year, the same physician had hospi-
talized Mrs. Corcoran during an earlier pregnancy and performed a suc-
cessful Caesarian section when the fetus went into distress. This time,
the utilization review company decided that ten hours of nursing care
was medically sufficient. What would a responsible plan and its mem-
bers reasonably expect? It is likely that some form of round-the-clock
monitoring would be necessary if the pregnant woman could not detect
fetal distress without professional help. In-patient hospitalization, how-
ever, may not have been necessary. Twenty-four hour home nursing may
have been sufficient, unless a nurse would not be able to respond imme-
diately to the expected risk at home. Under a reasonable expectations
standard, a court should be able to consider not only whether United
acted negligently in choosing limited home nursing as it would do in a
negligence action, but also whether the covered benefits should include
round-the-clock monitoring in such high risk pregnancies.
Another case in which the reasonable expectation standard would not
guarantee a plaintiff victory in all benefit disputes is the widely publi-
cized case of Helene Fox, whose estate obtained an $89.1 million verdict
against Health Net for denying coverage of autologous bone marrow
transplantation (ABMT) to treat her metastatic breast cancer.154 The case
has been cited as an example of a health plan allowing profit to override
necessary medical care. There is reason to believe that there should be
no coverage for the experimental treatment at issue because a responsi-
ble plan and its members would not reasonably expect such a benefit. If
experimental therapies are not excluded, it becomes difficult to define
any limits on benefits. The plan's prior approval of ABMT for two other
patients raises a different, but equally important issue: whether Health
152. Seeid atl331.
153. See id.
154. See Fox v. Health Net of California, No. 219692 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993); Christine Woolsey, Jury Hits HMOfor Coverage De-
nial, BuS. INS., Jan. 3, 1994. The California legislature responded by making
ABMT a mandated benefit of most health plans in California. See CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE, § 14133.8 (Deering 1994).
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Net's decision was a responsible analysis of ABMT's investigational
status, existing data on its effectiveness for advanced breast cancer, and
the condition of each patient, or whether Health Net acted arbitrarily or
selectively in providing coverage for different patients in its plan. A
reasonable expectations analysis might find it reasonable to exclude
coverage of ABMT in Ms. Fox's case. However, it would probably also
find it unreasonable to apply different standards to different patients in
similar cilrcumstances. Furthermore, it would likely be unreasonable to
delay a decision on coverage until it was too late for Ms. Fox to obtain
other treatment outside the plan.
Although the purpose of using a new reasonableness standard to de-
termine the nature of covered benefits is to avoid the problems arising
from standard form contract language with which patients are not fa-
miliar, it need not preclude special health plans with special provisions.
However, if such provisions are not generally expected under the rea-
sonableness standard, then it would be unfair to enforce them unless
they were expressly and knowingly agreed to by the individual. Given
the personal service nature of the managed care relationship, the man-
aged care organization should have an obligation to disclose and explain
all terms in the contract that it wishes to enforce. This should be an on-
going obligation in which the organization must announce and explain
all changes in such terms sufficiently in advance of any attempt to en-
force them. No change in enforcement should take effect in the middle
of the contract year without the agreement of the member. There'fore,
managed care organizations should have a.corporate duty to obtain the
informed consent of each member to material issues in the contract and
to material changes in benefits, exclusions, providers, and procedures.
Reasonable expectations can also apply to the distribution of benefits
and burdens among members of a managed care plan. Insurers already
have an obligation to use their premium revenues for the benefit of the
health plan population. However, a reasonable expectation of a fair dis-
tribution of benefits goes beyond an insurer's duty to use good faith in
determiniing and paying claims. 55 It should include a duty to ensure that
155. Today, health plan members may not feel a strong kinship with other
people solely by virtue of being members of the same plan. In the past, mutual
insurance groups and cooperatives had a closer sense of community and mutual
assistance. See Emily Freedman, Capitation, Integration, and Managed Care:
Lessons from Early Experience, 275 JAMA 957, 958 (1996). However, even indi-
viduals randomly associated in a modem health plan can appreciate the need to
distribute benefits fairly among members of the group.
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the organization's assets are used prudently for patient care and not di-
verted to unnecessary administrative expenses, such as uninformative
advertising, or excessive compensation. The duty to use an organiza-
tion's assets for the benefit of patients is effectively a fiduciary obliga-
tion that sounds in tort rather than contract. A managed care organiza-
tion's obligations therefore should include fiduciary duties to each indi-
vidual patient, as well as to the entire population of its members. Such
fiduciary duties should ensure that the benefit package covers appropri-
ate care and that care is provided properly to each individual on a non-
discriminatory basis. Finally, managed care organizations must be ac-
countable to individuals for their acts and omissions. This means ensur-
ing that individuals have meaningful recourse for enforcing plan obliga-
tions, both contractual and extra-contractual, and obtaining compensa-
tion for injury resulting from negligence.
Extra-contractual standards are most appropriate for judicial elabora-
tion. Better judicial standards are necessary because legislation cannot
eliminate disputes between individuals and their health plans. However,
ERISA is likely to preclude enforcement of extra-contractual standards
developed in state common law against ERISA health plans. Such stan-
dards may affect, and therefore "relate to," the benefit contract by re-
quiring specific disclosures, benefits, or principles by which one may
measure the benefits or performance. 156 Moreover, although state law
156. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 645 (7th Cir. 1995) ('[W]here
state law has the effect of creating a qualitative standard (e.g., 'bad faith,' 'im-
proper') by which the performance of the contract is evaluated, then that state law
is completely preempted."). Section 514(a) of the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, preempts any
state law, including common law, that "relates to" an employee benefit plan gov-
erned by ERISA. Originally ERISA was enacted to protect employees from losing
their pensions as a result of mismanagement or inadequate funding. ERISA estab-
lished uniform national standards for pension funding and vesting, imposed stan-
dards for fiduciary responsibility, requirements to report plan information to the
Labor Department, and disclosure of a summary plan for information to partici-
pants. ERISA preemption applies to virtually all employee benefit plans, including
group health insurance plans, voluntarily offered by employers and unions. There
are some exceptions, such as churches and the federal government. However,
ERISA does not contain any substantive standards for health insurance, or other
non-pension plan benefits, such as covered benefits, provider arrangements, utili-
zation review procedures, or grievance mechanisms. The U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the preemption clause expansively to foreclose the application of a wide
range of state laws that affected, sometimes negligibly, ERISA plans until its 1995
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holds all managed care organizations legally accountable in theory,
ERISA preemption provisions shield ERISA plans from liability for
their own negligence. 157 While it may be possible to craft a few stan-
dards tha meet the narrow exceptions to ERISA preemption in this
decision in N.Y. State Conference of BlueCross & BlueShield Plans v. Traveler's
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). Even after the Traveler's decision, courts frequently
found that ERISA preempts much state legislation regulating fianaged care. See
Mariner, supra note 56, at 1989.
157. Following the Supreme Court's lead, courts generally found that neg-
ligence or malpractice claims based on state law could not be brought against
ERISA health plans. See Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir.
1995); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Kuhl v. Lincoln
Nat. Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v.
United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1992). Patients were sometimes
able to bring a claim against the plan for denial of benefits under ERISA section
502(a). Set, e.g., Velez v. Prudential Health Care Plan of N.Y., Inc., 943 F. Supp.
332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Yet, the statute limits recovery to the cost of the benefit -
the price of the treatment denied - and precluded compensatory damages for per-
sonal injury, such as medical expenses, lost wages, emotional suffering, and other
losses. Beginning with the Third Circuit's decision in Dukes v. US Healthcare,
Inc., 57 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), several courts of appeals found that ERISA does
not preempt malpractice claims against an ERISA plan that are based on the plan's
vicarious liability for a physician's negligence in providing treatment if the physi-
cian was the plan's employee, agent, or ostensible agent. The Third Circuit distin-
guished between complaints about the quality of care received - medical deci-
sions - and complaints that the plan wrongfully denied covered benefits or negli-
gently administered plan benefits - benefit decisions. Several courts of appeals
have followed the Dukes reasoning, allowing vicarious liability claims to proceed
as ordinary malpractice actions under state law on the theory that the claim is not
preempted because it does not relate to plan benefits or administration. See Jas v.
Prudential, 88 F.3d 1482 (6th Cir. 1996); Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59
F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995). At the
same time, most courts continue to find that state law claims based on corporate
liability - that a plan negligently denied benefits entirely, delayed authorizing
benefits, limited coverage to plan providers, or failed to ensure the competence of
its physicians -are preempted because they relate to the health plan's benefit de-
terminations. See Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.
1998); Turner v. Fallon Comm. Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1512 (1998); Jas, 88 F.3d at 1482; Cannon v. Group
Health Serv. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996). See generally Furrow,
supra note 90; Mariner, supra note 88 (collecting cases and arguing that the dis-
tinction between vicarious liability and corporate liability claims is increasingly
untenable for purposes of ERISA preemption).
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arena, such efforts may only invite more controversy and litigation."'
Thus, legislation will be necessary to permit the development of extra-
contractual standards. Once again, Annas is right. Protecting patients
will require national legislation. Even protecting patients in private, vol-
untary employee benefit plans will require national legislation.
CONCLUSION
There is a danger that enthusiasm for consumer rights in managed
care may unwittingly sweep aside important patient rights that remain
necessary for all patients, whether or not they are members of managed
care plans. Proponents of a competitive market in health insurance argue
that consumer choice will force managed care organizations to compete
by improving quality and service, as well as lowering prices, to meet
consumer demand. But employer-provided health plans restrict con-
sumer choice, and the use of standard form insurance contracts all but
eliminates any remaining role for individual choice. It is unlikely that
cost control can be achieved by enforcing contract exclusions against
insured patients, especially if the justification for enforcement is free-
dom of contract.
The interpretation and regulation of health insurance contracts as or-
dinary standard form insurance policies may have been acceptable when
health insurance contacts provided indemnity benefits alone. Managed
care, however, also recommends, organizes, and often determines what
services may be obtained from which providers. The dual nature of
managed care, therefore, demands attention to both tort and contract
elements. Although legal principles governing standard form insurance
policies may apply to the consumer elements in managed care, they can-
not adequately define or enforce legal rights and obligations for patient
care.
The undesirability, not to mention the difficulty, of drafting legisla-
tion specifying standards of care and other matters of personal medical
services, argues against exclusive reliance on legislation, or even regu-
lation, as a definitive solution to interpreting and enforcing managed
care arrangements. Although federal legislation may be required to de-
158. See, e.g., Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't. of Ins., Civil
Action No. H-97-2072, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14831 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 1998).
For a more nuanced discussion of what relates to ERISA plans for purposes of
ERISA preemption, see American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health
Care, 973 F. Supp. 60 (D. Mass. 1997).
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velop non..legislative responses, it cannot, and need not, specify the de-
tails of managed care relationships. There will inevitably be a need for
general principles that courts can use to assess new issues. Developing
principles to regulate and enforce managed care obligations will require
a hybrid approach that recognizes the reality of managed care's mixed
functions. This approach should apply contract, tort, and mixed stan-
dards to resolve disputes. Tort standards can and should apply to many
issues of managed care performance, specifically including the provision
of personal medical services. At the same time, some issues traditionally
associated with tort obligations may require contractual enforcement
mechanisms. Courts should treat managed care contracts as a special
type of standard form contract that combines elements of insurance and
obligations to provide the services of qualified professionals, subject to
extra-contractual standards based on a revitalized concept of reasonable
expectations. The policy goal should be to fosjer contracts that cover
whatever responsible managed care organizations and patients with
equal bargaining power and good information would consider fair at a
stated price.
Patient rights are not only compatible with managed care, they are
necessary to make it work. This approach will not directly protect the
rights of patients who have no health insurance. However, this approach
recognizes that all patients have rights that cannot be overridden by
contract. Unlike some consumer protection legislation, the approach
does not threaten to eliminate the rights of patients. After all, being a
patient does not depend on having health insurance, and the rights of
patients should not depend on health insurance contracts.
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TABLE I - CONSUMER V. PATIENT
CONSUMER PATIENT
Product Availability Access to Care
Range of "products" Personal income/resources
(indemnity, service benefit, Private insurance
HIMO, PPO, IPA, POS, etc.) Eligibility for government benefits
Source of "product" (Medicare, Medicaid, VA,
(employer group health plan; CHAMPUS, SCHIPS, etc.)
individual policy/membership) Government employer health plan
Comparative information Free care for uninsured and indi-
No false advertising gent (free care pools, Hill-
No misleading marketing practices Burton, etc.)
Price
Financial Solvency & Management Confidence in Availability of
Services
Adequate capital reserves Patient membership on governing
Prudent investment standards board
Contingency plan/insurance for





Provider Pool Adequacy Provider Pool Quality
Adequate number of providers Providers qualified by professional
(based on membership need) competence
Back up system when providers Patient choice of qualified pro-
not available (e.g., out of net vider
work providers) No provider conflicts of interest
Accessible locations No barriers to care (e.g., language;
Full disclosure of available pro- discrimination on personal traits
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TABLE I (CONTINUED)
CONSUMERI PATIENT
Benefit Package Patient Care
Full disclcsure of all covered Access to medically necessary
benefits, exclusions and limit- services (including emergency
ations care)
Full disclosure of process of de- Access to independent medical
termining benefits and exclu- opinion on need for and
sions appropriateness of
Use of credible/independent tech- recommended care or lack of
nology assessment data treatment
Access to independent patient ad-
vocate or ombudsperson to
assist in benefit determinations
Right to treatment only with in
formed consent (including right
to refuse treatment)
Prohibition against denying other
Treatment or benefits for pa-
tient's refusal of a treatment
Right to designate health care
proxy (surrogate) with binding
decision making power
Quality of Care Quality of Care
Full disclosure of all covered Provider accountability (liability)
benefits to patient for negligence
Full disclosure of process of de- Confidentiality of all personal
termining benefits and exclu- medical information and records
sions No disclosure of confidential in-
Use of cr4edible/independent tech- formation beyond that author-
nology assessment data ized by patient or necessary to
immediate care
Respect for privacy and dignity in
treatment setting
19981




Full disclosure of prices Affordable prices
Comparative price information Availability of free care for indi-
Community rating gent
No discriminatory annual or life-
time caps on benefits
No discriminatory deductibles or
Copayments
Government approval of premiums
Enforcement Mechanisms Enforcement Mechanisms
Fair and efficient grievance proce- Access to independent patient ad-
dures for resolving complaints vocate or ombudsperson
about benefits, exclusions, treat- Access to judicial review
ment, discrimination, etc.
Full disclosure of grievance proce-
dures and results
Full disclosure of financial infor-
mation to government regulatory
authority
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TABLE II - MIXED PATIENT AND CONSUMER
Provider Pool
Adequate number of providers available and accessible
Adequate types of providers to meet medical needs
(physicians and other health professionals, labs,
hospitals, clinics, home care, etc.)
Licensure and certification of health care professionals
Licensure and accreditation of insurers and health care
Facilities
Prohibition against financial incentives to providers to
withhold appropriate care or to provide inappropriate
care
Prohibition against self-referral arrangements or other
conflicts of interest
Enforcement Mechanisms
Direct plan accountability (liability) for corporate negli-
gence in determining benefits, selecting and monitoring
providers, influencing medical treatment, advertising
and marketing, and administering the plan
Indirect plan accountability (liability) for negligence of all
employees, agents, and (except when in contravention of
corporate directives) contract-providers
Independent external review of quality of patient care
Government review and approval of:
Financial information
Premiums
Reasonableness of non-patient care expenditures




Grievance procedures (for coverage decisions, treat-
ment, discrimination, etc.)
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